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ABSTRACT
The United States currently has interests in the South Atlantic
and Antarctica which have traditionally taken a back seat to U.S. inter-
ests in other regions. In the closing years of the twentieth century,
those interests likely will receive more attention as the United States
and the global community shifts its attention from the traditional focus
on East-West issues and their conflict potential to more nationalist
interests. This thesis examines U.S. interests in the South Atlantic
and Antarctica and evaluates the potential challenges to those
interests. The thesis concludes that, while its interests in the South
Atlantic remain, the United States will find it increasingly more
difficult to extend its influence as the countries of the region exert
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this last decade of the twentieth century, the United States is
faced with reassessing its global interests. Security assumptions must be
redefined in light of new variables and a changing global order, including
the decline of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, the turmoil in East-
ern Europe as former Soviet satellites pursue alternate paths, and rede-
mocratization in countries of South America and Eastern Europe.
The 1990s may require the United States to focus more on its own
hemisphere as traditional relations become problematic. The assumption
of security in its backyard allowed the United States to pursue interests
far beyond its borders, but U.S. hegemony can no longer be assumed.
The question now is not one of "Will U.S. influence in the hemisphere,
particularly in the South Atlantic, decline?" but rather "To what extent
has U.S. influence declined?" (Molineu, 1987, pp. 38-40) In the 1990s
and beyond, one can expect even more challenges to U.S. interests as the
Third World seeks a greater share of global wealth and a larger role in the
international community.
Traditionally, the United States, when it has looked south, has
focused on Central America and the Caribbean, its "strategic rear," with
a marked indifference to issues further south. The South Atlantic will
increasingly become important in the 1990s and beyond. A region histor-
ically outside U.S. dominance, the issues currently affecting the area
make tacit assurance of U. S. interests a thing of the past.
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These issues include a resurgence of social and political uncertain-
ties in the wake of redemocratization in the Southern Cone: an increas-
ingly more aggressive stance by regional actors in asserting national and
regional interests over hemispheric solidarity, the growing international
pressures surrounding the Antarctic Treaty System as it works toward
the creation of a minerals regime for the continent and approaches 1991
and the possibility of a treaty review, and the increased potential for
Soviet influence in the region as the Gorbachev initiatives gain
momentum. If for no other reason, the trend toward closer ties between
the Southern Cone leaders (Brazil and Argentina) and the East Bloc
should be cause for directing more attention to the region.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues of the South
Atlantic area and Antarctica as they affect both regional and extra-
regional actors. These issues, singly, contain significant conflict poten-
tial; the confluence equates to an unmistakable challenge to traditional
means of conflict resolution, which range from power politics and gun-
boat diplomacy to compromise and negotiation. While the range of
possible scenarios is broad, and the potential for conflict, at times,
ambiguous, the implications for U.S. interests are real.
Divided into five basic discussion topics, this study focuses first on
the South Atlantic and competing interests in the region, which include
the sea lanes of communication, security issues, and a discussion of the
naval capabilities of the key South Atlantic States and competing
regional geopolitical thought which affect national actions.
2
One of the potentially most conflictual scenarios in the austral hemi-
sphere surrounds the status of Antarctica in the next decade. Chapter III
focuses on the rivalries and competing interests in Antarctica and the
challenges posed by several internationally proposed alternatives to the
continuity of the continent's current "regime," or means of administra-
tion: the Antarctic Treaty System. As a follow-on to this discussion,
Chapter IV reviews the Antarctic Treaty, its problem-solving mechanisms,
and its history as one of the most successfully concluded international
cooperative and administrative ventures still in existence.
The final two chapters of this study entail a review of U.S. interests
in the South Atlantic and Antarctica and the role of the U.S. Navy in
securing and/or ensuring those interests. The area is not one which
often has commanded a great measure of attention from U.S. policy
makers, yet it is an area with significant potential for conflict and
challenge.
In the conclusion, it will be shown that the United States cannot
ensure the protection of its interests by traditional means, either military
intervention or sheer force of will. The specter of intra- and extra-regional
conflict is all too real; its potential for drawing superpower or traditional
rivalries into the region is a possibility which must be countered with
new and innovative methods of diplomacy and compromise.
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II. THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND COMPETING INTERESTS
A. BACKGROUND
Identifying U.S. interests in Latin America is difficult at best. Conse-
quently, identifying interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctica is even
more problematic. This difficulty stems from the ebb and flow of U.S.
attention and the shifting priority of the region in relation to other areas.
The region particularly suffers from an on-again, off-again approach by
policy makers. The United States has tended to pay little attention to the
area until there is a specific, clearly delineated challenge to its interests.
When the challenge is unmistakable, from the U.S. perspective, the
response has most often been military intervention, in the case of the
Caribbean and Central America, and various pressures and sanctions, in.
the countries further from U.S. borders.
Generally, interests in the region revolve around the dual themes of
security and stability. The United States, traditionally looking toward the
Eurasian continent for its major threat, has relied on stability in the
South Atlantic nations to assure security and ensure that its efforts are
not divided.
1. General Interests in the Region
Traditionally, the U.S. hemispheric policy centered around polit-
ical, economic, and security interests. To a great degree, these interests
differ little from U.S. interests world-wide and are no less valid today.
"Preventing the introduction of a strategic threat Into the Hemisphere
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rightly remains a primary U.S. objective, one that should be pursued
both by military deterrence and by multilateral diplomacy." (Lowenthal,
1987, p.5)
The political, economic, and security concerns of the United
States in Latin America are often interconnected and difficult to separate.
Issues in one category often times spill over into other categories, making
resolution of problems a complex undertaking. In addition, the issues of
importance to the United States may not be issues of national interest to
the Latin American nations, or if they are, they may be only secondary
issues.
Generally speaking, U.S. interests in Latin America may be cat-
egorized as political, economic, and military-strategic. M. Daly Hayes has
outlined several reasons which have increased the status of the South
Atlantic in the relative ranking of global concern. (Hayes, 1984, pp.
225-226)
In the strategic arena, the sea lines of communication would
become much more important in the event of East-West hostilities or
when regional conflict disrupts the flow of commerce. The Cape of Good
Hope and the Cape Horn routes attain primacy when the Suez and
Panama Canals are threatened. Even now, the large supertankers and
larger naval vessels, such as amphibious landing ships and aircraft car-
riers, are too large to use the canals, placing this greater emphasis on
the assured passage via the Cape routes.
In addition, the "substantial upgrading of military capabiliies
by nations in the region, through the purchase of sophisticated weapons
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and development of indigenous arms industries" is cause for attention
(Hayes, 1984, p. 226). Not only does this decrease dependence on the
traditional sources of arms and supplies but it also complicates the stra-
tegic scenario by increasing the numbers of militarily capable players.
Economic issues are of prime concern to the nations of the
austral hemisphere as they seek ways to assure success of their respec-
tive development strategies. For these countries, national security is
often equated with economic development. Toward that end, commercial/
economic relations take on increased importance, and the sea lanes of
the South Atlantic are busy with maritime commerce between the Middle
East, Africa, South America, and Japan, as well as to the United States
and Europe. (Hayes, 1984, p. 226)
Instability in the region remains a concern for the United
States, particularly if there is the perception of Soviet adventurism.
Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa and the associated
instability are the focus of U.S. concern over the perceived spread of
Eastern influence. (Hayes, 1984, p. 226)
There is no consensus on Soviet intentions in the South Atlantic
and Antarctica, due largely to the difficulty in assessing Soviet actions.
One thing is clear, Judging from the broad-based Soviet economic initia-
tives: the South Atlantic has become an area of increasing importance for
the Soviets. Strategic denial (that is, keeping the Soviets out of the hemi-
sphere) is, according to Schoultz, the critical concern for U.S. policy
makers who view it as a "zero-sum" game competition with the Soviet
Union, whereby any loss for the United States in the hemisphere is
6
necessarily a gain for the Soviet Union (Schoultz, 1987, p. 225). While no
permanent bases for Soviet activities exist in the Southern Cone (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), and only limited facilities are available on
the western coast of Africa, there have been unmistakable advances in
Soviet presence in the South Atlantic of a non-military nature. The Sovi-
ets clearly have established objectives for Latin America and are focusing
on the Southern Cone leaders (Vacs in Muhal-Leon, 1989, p. 320). In
light of the long U.S. involvement in the area, any involvement by an
"unfriendly" extrahemispheric actor is unsettling. The South Atlantic,
while not displacing traditional areas of U.S. interests, likely will increase
in significance relative to the past.
a. Political Interests
The presumption of United States-led hemispheric solidar-
ity ha not been assured for quite a few years. On many issues, the United
States finds itself at odds with the countries of Latin America, particu-
larly in the Southern Cone, in the "North-South" arena. Rather than an
unquestioned following, the Latin nations are more likely to stand with
other developing nations on issues than with the Western Hemisphere
block.
Even on issues within the hemisphere, solidarity has bro-
ken down. The most recent and well-publicized example is the South
Atlantic War between the United Kingdom and Argentina. In the United
Nations, as well, the United States cannot assume an automatic
following.
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On key contemporary issues, Washington must expect most Latin
American nations to vote according to their individual interests.
Each vote must be lobbied for, none can be taken for granted on the
basis of presumed regional harmony. (Lowenthal, 1987, p. 7)
The principal South American countries, particularly
Brazil, are in a position to influence international issues and have an
impact on the success or failure of U.S. interests. It may not appear that
the countries have significant international political strength individually,
but in condominium they become a powerful block, not to be ignored.
... [Slecuring the cooperation of Latin American countries, in the
mutual interest of all, should be the central goal of U.S. foreign pol-
icy. That cooperation cannot be assumed or coerced; it will have to
be achieved. (Lowenthal, 1987, p. 16)
With the movement toward redemocratization in the region
comes increased tolerance of political diversity, including leftist political
groupings. This trend works to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which
seeks to expand its influence as the leftist groups pursue newly "legal"
activities. (Department of Defense, 1989, p. 29)
b. Economic Interests
The United States does not depend solely on Latin America
for any single commodity, though some of the countries are still principal
suppliers of certain products (e.g., iron, copper, tin, bauxite, and petro-
leum). As a source of strategic materials, Latin America's importance has
declined, due largely to the diversification of U.S. trade and the increased
use of synthetics. However, the United States has a significant import
reliance on several important minerals and metals. (Mikesell, 1986,
p. 31)
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While U.S. dependence on the region as a source of strate-
gic materials has declined, Latin America is gaining increasing influence
on the U.S. and world economies. In 1988, 13 percent of Argentine
imports came from the United States, while 18 percent of Argentine
exports were destined for the United States. Twenty-one percent (21%) of
Chilean imports came from the United States and 20 percent of her
exports went to the United States. Brazil's share was even larger, with
approximately 38 percent of her exports going to the United States, with
34 percent of imports being of U.S. origin. (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, September 1989, p. 2; January 1990, p. 2; July 1989, p. 2)
c. Security Interests
The threat to U.S. military security posed by realistically imaginable
events in the Western Hemisphere is much less serious than it used
to be. No direct military attack on the territory of the United States
is likely to be mounted in the foreseeable future from locations in the
Western Hemisphere. (Lowenthal, 1987, p. 3)
Probability of attack from the South was greatest in 1962.
Not since the Navy's 4th Fleet was based in northern Brazil during the
Second World War has the United States maintained a base in South
America.
The Panama Canal, while still an important interest, is no
longer a "vital" concern, primarily because of the decline in U.S. foreign
commerce using the canal (less than one-sixth of U.S. ocean trade) and
the inability of supertankers and aircraft carriers to use it.
Preoccupation with the Caribbean and Central America and
the emphasis on maintaining the security of vital Caribbean sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) and the absence of a clearly delineated threat
9
have served to steer U.S. attention away from the South Atlantic. Tradi-
tionally, the United States has tended to adopt a "negative approach" to
security in the hemisphere, that is, security from the standpoint of what
could be prevented (Hayes, 1984, p. 7). This philosophy assumes the
"zero-sum" premise and, therefore, prompts policies and actions which
are exclusionary in nature.
2. Strategic Access and Denial
For the United States, security of petroleum supplies and stra-
tegic and raw materials is a concern in the South Atlantic. The United
States has become one of the world's largest importers of raw materials
(Schoultz, 1987, p. 143). Access to those areas and the free passage of
those materials to the North are important. Lars Schoultz disclaims the
actual strategic value of some resources, but even he acknowledges that
the United States has a critical need for certain raw materials, and that
therefore the national security consequences of supply disruption are
significant. (Schoultz, 1987, p. 149)
After reviewing the increased commercial ties between Argentina
and Brazil and the Soviet Union and the first-time exchange of military
attaches, one might well wonder whether there is a basis for concern over
Soviet influence in the region. The Soviet initiatives toward opening rela-
tions with Argentina and Brazil, the two principal actors, have taken on a
marked "pragmatism," an element which has an appreciative audience in
the Southern Cone (Vacs in Muhal-Leon, 1989, pp. 320-321). The Soviets
have important economic interests in Latin America, seeking primarily
metals and foodstuffs but also an export market for their own
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manufactured products. For example, Soviet exports to Argentina rose
from 24.8 million rubles in 1979 to 63.0 million in 1985. During the
same period, Brazilian imports of Soviet goods Jumped from 19.9 to 70.2
million rubles. Soviet import figures during the same period were equally
significant. Brazil exported 380 million rubles worth of goods, more than
double the 1979 figure of 160 million rubles. Argentina's imports from
the Soviet Union rose from 288.7 million rubles in 1979 to 1,229 million
rubles in 1985 (Evanson in Muhal-Leon, 1989, pp. 234-235). Granted,
there is some prejudice against Soviet goods, owing largely to their inferi-
ority, but the important factor here is the establishment of trade/eco-
nomic relations as part of an overall Soviet strategy to secure a presence
in the region. Excluding Cuba, Argentina and Brazil are far and away the
Soviet Union's largest trading partners in Latin America. (Evanson in
Muhal-Leon, 1989, p. 235, Table 7.2)
Argentina, the "maverick" of the Southern Cone, has entered
into several bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union which have
potentially adverse ramifications for the U.S. interest of strategic denial.
Most disconcerting was the Soviet proposal in 1986 for dredging and
remodeling the port at Bahia Blanca. The terms of the contract were
highly favorable, including a financing scheme by Soviet-procured
sources and credits payable in Argentine food products, which would
avoid the expenditure of the Argentine treasury's limited hard-currency
reserves (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, February
19, 1986, p. D5). This scheme is advantageous to both countries,
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allowing Argentina to maintain currency reserves while not worsening the
trade imbalance for the Soviets.
The port at Bahia Blanca was formerly a minor fishing fleet
facility. Though a slow-moving project, its completion will make it a
major deep-water port, a significant plus for the Argentine economy, and
with potentially great benefits for the large Soviet fishing fleet which plies
the waters between the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, December 31, 1986,
p. Dl). With Soviet involvement an integral part of the upgrading of the
port and the extensive use by the Soviet fishing fleet, pessimists may
wonder how long it might be before the Argentine government grants per-
mission for the Soviet Navy to use this port facility, should it ever decide
to deploy in the region.
Further expansion of Soviet-Argentine relations along this line
includes a major contract for the repair and maintenance of Soviet fish-
ing vessels in Argentina, the supply of important hydroelectric and ther-
moelectric equipment (including turbines, transformers, and generators).
as well as fishing agreements between Argentina, the Soviet Union, and
other Eastern Bloc countries. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Latin America, December 23, 1986, p. D1; May 2, 1986, p. D4; December
31, 1986, p. D2)
It can be argued that U.S. influence in Argentina has never been
great; even so, the United States has so far at least been able to bank on
a minimum Argentine policy of "benevolent neutrality." Between the
trend in Argentine-Soviet relations over the past decade toward greater
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economic interdependence and a seemingly dogged Argentine determi-
nation to "go its own way," the United States has reason for concern.
Should the Soviets choose to deploy their navy to the region, the ramifi-
cations are immense. As Ranft and Till point out: "Simply by being in an
area, the Navy makes a whole range of political and strategic options
available to the Soviet Union." (Ranft & Till, 1983, p. 202)
Argentina is not the only Southern Cone nation experiencing an
upswing in Soviet relations. Brazil also has opened its doors to Soviet
trade. Its territorial expanse, large population, and political influence rel-
ative to the region (both within Latin America and the former Portuguese
colonies in Africa), have made it an attractive target for the Soviets. In
addition, Brazil produces many of the goods which the Soviets are eager
to import and offers the largest market in Latin America for Soviet prod-
ucts. Brazil shares Argentina's prejudice against Soviet-manufactured
products, but even so its economic ties with the Soviet Union have
expanded as significantly as Argentina's. (Vacs in Muhal-Leon, 1989, pp.
333-337)
The Soviets have an interest in Brazilian micro-computers
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, December 19,
1986, p. B3), and more recently the two countries have agreed on a joint
space project for the study and exploration of Mars (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Latin America, December 22, 1986, p. B1). In 1988,
negotiations were announced for the sale of a $50 million gas bottling
unit to the Brazilians. (Latin America Regional Reports-Brazil, June 2,
1988, p. 3)
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Adding to the encouragement of Soviet ties in the economic
arena is the fact that the Soviets have never followed the U.S. example
nor shown their displeasure with the region's internal politics by invok-
ing economic sanctions. This type of "non-interference" has served to
shape favorable attitudes in the Latin nations which could lead to even
further expansion and consolidation of Soviet relations. Thus, the Soviets
have achieved one of their primary objectives in the region: establishing a
"real" presence.
Another objective for the Soviets in the region is forging stronger
diplomatic ties. They appear to be well on their way to the successful
accomplishment of this goal. For the first time in the history of Soviet-
Argentine relations, an Argentine head of state. President Raul Alfonsin,
made an official visit to the Soviet Union in May 1986. This move pre-
saged a more intense link with the socialist bloc as Alfonsin noted the
difficulties Argentina faced in placing its products in "traditional" West-
ern markets. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America,
January 21, 1986, p. D4)
Brazil's former president, Jose Sarney, also made an official
visit to the Soviet Union in October 1988, the first such visit by a Brazil-
ian head of state. The Soviets fdted both Argentine and Brazilian
presidents and accorded the visiting dignitaries full state honors (Wash-
ington Post, October 19, 1988, p. A26). The two countries have
announced that diplomatic relations will be expanded to include the
exchange of military attaches. (Latin American Regional Reports-Brazil,
November 24, 1988, p. 1)
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These visits, as well as the return visit to Latin America (Cuba)
in April 1989 by Soviet President Gorbachev (though not yet to either
Argentina or Brazil) and increased economic relations, are indicative of
the shifting priorities in the Soviet Union's Latin American foreign policy.
It is apparent that the Soviet leadership views the region not as a bastion
of U.S. hegemony but rather as a region with potential for Soviet
influence.
Although Soviet international objectives for the South Atlantic
may have progressed in Argentina and Brazil, the same has not been true
in the case of the two other major regional players: Chile and South
Africa. Between 1973 and 1990, Chile maintained an extremely strong
anti-Soviet posture. Diplomatic relations were severed by the Pinochet
regime; however, with the return to civilian government, it may be possi-
ble that Chile will follow the lead of its traditional Latin ally, Brazil, and
seek national development through diversification of international con-
tacts, including Moscow.
Like Chile, South Africa also maintains a strong anti-Soviet
stance and has long stressed the threat posed to Western interests in
southern Africa and the South Atlantic by the increased Soviet presence
and growing influence. Currently, South Africa's foreign policy agenda is
aimed at overcoming its isolation from the global community. The tradi-
tional strain of anti-Soviet sentiment is still prevalent in South African
foreign policy, which makes it unlikely, on the one hand, that the country
will pursue Soviet ties in the near-term. On the other hand, however, the
possibility of Soviet-South African relations should not be completely
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ruled out. Past anti-Soviet sentiments in South America have given way,
in Brazil and Argentina especially, to economic ties and cooperative ven-
tures. The relations with these countries, particularly Argentina, may
influence the South African government's attitude toward the adoption of
similar politically pluralistic policies.
Traditionally, South Africa's strongest ties to Latin America have
been with Argentina, but recently Chile has become a close "friend" and
trade partner. In an October 1987 visit, South African finance minister
Barend du Plessis pledged to promote investment in Chile and increase
trade between the two countries. Chilean exports to South Africa in 1986
totalled US$29.3 million and figures for the first one-half of 1987 reached
US$18.8 million. South African exports to Chile in 1986 amounted to
US$34.6 million and US$22.8 million in the first half of 1987 (Latin
American Regional Reports-Southern Cone, November 19, 1987, p. 3).
While Brazil acknowledges the market potential in South Africa, it has
remained ambivalent about closer relations.
Both South Africa and Chile have had to run the course of
international ostracism for their domestic policies. In a show of South
African-Chilean solidarity following a private visit, South African Foreign
Minister Botha contended that, like his country, Chile was the victim of a
"campaign of distortion, which [does] not reflect [their] reality." (Latin
American Regional Reports-Southern Cone, April 21, 1988, p. 4)
South African relations with Argentina, particularly during that
country's rule by military Juntas, were close. Information exchange and
the maintenance of large military (particularly naval) missions were
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commonplace. While formal diplomatic ties between the two countries
have been severed, there is significant speculation that "unofficial con-
tacts" remain strong. It was through these presumed "unofficial contacts"
that the reported arms deal was conducted in 1985-1986, in violation of
the United Nations-imposed embargo against South Africa. The "scandal"
involved the French and Danish governments and the Argentine Navy in
the supply of French-made weapons, transferred in five shipments via a
Danish vessel, to the South African port of Durban. The weapons origi-
nally had been sold to the Argentine Navy, and while all parties deny
complicity in the matter, the weapons are now in the possession of the
South Africans. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America,
January 14, 1986, p. D2)
The regional ties in the South Atlantic increasingly are taking
on unanticipated forms. Through economic and trade relations as well as
diplomatic openings, new alignments are forming which, in combination
with other areas of concern (discussed later in this study) present the
United States with a formidable challenge. As discussed earlier, the
Soviet Union has forged strong economic ties with both Brazil and Argen-
tina, while South Africa and Chile, both facing considerable adverse
international pressures, are exploring closer relations with each other.
Perhaps most worrying for the U.S. position in the South
Atlantic is the lack of presence in the region, particularly in view of the
current Soviet strategy of "friendly competition" in the hemisphere. Aside
from annual bilateral naval exercises, the United States has little military
presence in the South Atlantic, and her allies are represented only
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minimally. The United States maintains no air or naval bases in either
Africa or South America. With the 1975 departure of the British from the
Simonstown facility in South Africa, only nominal U.S. and Allied pres-
ence remains in the South Atlantic- the United States in the Azores and
the British in the Faldands and Ascension.
Paralleling the lack of permanent U.S. presence in the region is
the rise in Soviet naval presence. Though traditionally concerned with
the defense of the homeland in a coastal scenario, the Soviet Navy has
shown its increasing capability to conduct "blue-water" operations. Soviet
naval presence in the South Atlantic since 1969, when Ghana seized two
Russian trawlers, and 1970, following an amphibious attack by the Por-
tuguese, has become "permanent." The Soviet naval contingent in the
region has become known as the West African Patrol (Hurrell, 1986,
p. 189). The Soviet naval contingent, upgraded during the Angolan war
and retained since that time, consists of six to seven vessels, including a
"Kresta II guided missile cruiser, a Kotlin guided missile destroyer, an
Alligator tank landing ship, a Ju/iett cruise missile submarine, an intelli-
gence collecting ship and two oilers." (Hritsik in Watson and Watson,
1986, p. 204)
The primary hindrance to a significant Soviet naval presence in
the South Atlantic has been the lack of permanent port facilities. Despite
this, the Soviets have been able to secure access to regional facilities,
such as Luanda and Lobito, Angola. The Soviet presence at these facili-
ties has enhanced their capabilities in the South Atlantic and created the
potential for Soviet interdiction and harassment of Western shipping as it
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rounds the Cape en route to the United States and Europe. (Hritsik in
Watson and Watson, 1986, pp. 204-205)
Soviet naval presence in the region is augmented by the devel-
opment of a surveillance capability. There has been a significant increase
in reconnaissance capability, comprised of Bear-D flights operating from
Cuba and Luanda (Hurrell, 1986, p. 7). These flights also provide intelli-
gence on North Atlantic events and increase the Soviet ability to exert
influence and project power into the South Atlantic. A final note must be
made concerning the Soviet naval capability in the South Atlantic:
"...through its West African contingent, the Soviet Union has a naval
force established in an area where there is no countervailing U.S. power."
(Hritsik in Watson and Watson, 1986, p. 207)
B. THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION
The sea lanes of the South Atlantic are numerous and, like the
strategic sea lanes in other parts of the globe, play an important role in
the geopolitical thoughts and actions of the South Atlantic states. Par-
ticularly prominent in this regard are the Beagle Channel, Magellan
Strait, and Drake Passage in the southwest region of the Atlantic, the
Atlantic Narrows in the south central Atlantic, and the Cape of Good
Hope in the southeast Atlantic (see map in Appendix A).
1. The Beagle Channel
The Beagle Channel, which is situated south of Tierra del Fuego
and lies between the Magellan Strait and Drake Passage, has been the
scene of the most recent intra-Latin American contest (between Argentina
and Chile) over control of maritime space.
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The dispute centers around three nearly uninhabited islands at
the eastern opening of the channel, Lennox, Picton, and Nueva Islands
(see map in Appendix B). The controversy over possession of these
islands nearly resulted in open warfare between Argentina and Chile in
1978. The origins obviously date much further back and involve territor-
ial issues and border debates from the time of independence.
The United Kingdom is also involved in this issue because it
was the British Crown which, in 1977, handed down the arbitration
which awarded the islands to Chile (Child, 1985, pp. 77-78). British
involvement in the Argentine-Chilean territorial disputes stems from a
1902 treaty which gave the Crown arbitration over sovereignty issues
(Child, 1985, p. 80). Until the decision of 1977, however, the Beagle
Channel limits were never clearly defined. The British involvement in the
Falklands also brings them into the Chilean-Argentine dispute for control
of the southern waterway.
Mere possession of the islands themselves is not the overriding
concern; rather, it is the territorial boundaries which would be affected
as well as the provision for claims further south in Antarctica. The cen-
tral concern over defining the specific boundary between the South
Atlantic and the South Pacific oceans has a direct impact on Antarctic
claims by both Argentina and Chile.
For the Chileans, possession of the islands would extend their
territorial boundaries along the arc of the Southern Antilles, through
South Georgia, South Sandwich, South Orkney, and South Shetland
Islands to the Palmer Peninsula of Antarctica. This claim, if validated,
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would seriously jeopardize Argentine claims in the region and make Chile
an Atlantic actor by extending its maritime space some 200 miles into
the South Atlantic. (Child, 1985, pp. 79-80)
The findings of a six-year study of the issue by an inter-national
team resulted in a favorable decision for the Chileans. The Argentines
rejected the results and proposed, in 1980, that Pope John Paul II nego-
tiate an agreement. The result of this papal intervention was also favor-
able to Chile and again rejected by Argentina (Pittman in Kelly and Child,
1988, p. 37). Key to the Argentine rejection was the presumed negation of
their "bioceanic principle" which set Cape Horn Island as the dividing
point between Argentine control of the Atlantic and Chilean control of the
Pacific (Morris, 1986, p. 51). The 1980 papal decision called for Chilean
control 12 miles beyond the disputed islands, with joint use of the area
in the outer six miles. Argentina was given jurisdiction over the 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to the east, but it allowed for joint
resource exploitation. The majority of the contested area lies to the east
of the Cape Horn Island line, thus making the ruling unacceptable to the
Argentine government. (Morris, 1986, pp. 50-51)
With the return of democracy following the ill-fated South Atlan-
tic conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom, leaders of Argen-
tina and Chile met at the Vatican on February 23, 1984, to sign a Joint
Declaration of Peace and Friendship. Following negotiations between the
two countries, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed November 29,
1984, which granted Chile possession of the disputed islands, fixed the
Chilean territorial sea at three miles, and limited the exclusive economic
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zone (Russell in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 75-76). It also confirmed the
Cape Horn meridian (670 15' west longitude) as the dividing line between
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. (Pittman in Kelly and Child. 1988, p. 38)
The most important result of the treaty, in addition to the reaf-
firmation of non-use of force in the event of future controversy, was the
establishment of a bilateral negotiating mechanism- the Conciliation
Commission- for the purpose of conflict resolution (Russell in Kelly and
Child, 1988, p. 76). In spite of the apparent amicable resolution of the
dispute and the mechanism in place for further negotiation, the conflict
may only be in recession rather than completely resolved. As Pittman
points out, "more controversy could erupt in this area in the future" as
hard-line advocates in both countries refuse to accept the current
settlement. (Pittman in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 176)
Not only is this area and subject a source of possible conflict
between Argentina and Chile but it also brings the United Kingdom into
the arena because of its territorial claim to the Falkland Islands. The
ocean area to the south of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, under the
existing (though internationally unrecognized) EEZ claims, becomes a tri-
national area of interest.
2. The Strait of Magellan
The Strait of Magellan was itself an area of contention by the
mid-1800s and by 1881 was the subject of a formal treaty between
Argentina and Chile (Pittman in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 174-176). The
strategic significance of the Magellan Strait for the West derives from its
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position as the only alternative to the Panama Canal as a point of trans-
oceanic (Atlantic-Pacific) passage. As Howard Pittman notes:
Control of the Drake Passage and the Strait of Magellan makes pos-
sible the interdiction of both north-south communications between
South American and Antarctica and between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans as well. (Pittman in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 42)
With the Panama Canal already incapable of accommodating the super-
tanker petroleum carriers or larger naval vessels, it is not difficult to
envision a conflict scenario that might call for added protection of the
southern approaches to ensure passage between the two oceans.
In order to completely understand the controversy surrounding
the Magellan Strait, one must look to colonial history. All through this
period, the strait, along with the Drake Passage, was the only passage
between the two oceans. To properly protect the early trade routes, the
Spanish crown dictated that the approaches be occupied in order to
guard against British, Dutch, and French privateers. Even at this early
stage, then, the geostrategic significance of the passages was already
acknowledged. (Caviedes in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 14-15)
Following independence, both Argentina and Chile struggled for
supremacy over the southern passages. The basis for their individual
claims lay in the division of the early administrative territories, the
Spanish Viceroyalties. Because of the imprecise nature of these colonial
territorial divisions, both countries believed they had clear title to the
southern extremes of the continent. Argentina claimed the right of con-
trol based on the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata boundaries, which
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included all of Patagonia, and which equates to all the current Chilean
territory south of approximately 420 south latitude.
The question of control over the eastern approach to the Strait
was thought to have been settled with the 1881 Treaty of Magellan
between Argentina and Chile. This treaty defined the territorial sea
fronting the strait at three nautical miles. In the 1970s, however, many of
the Latin American states began defining "national enclosures" and
declared exclusive economic zones out to 200 nautical miles. Chile and
Argentina each claimed territorial seas to 12 miles plus a 188-mile EEZ
(Morris, 1986, p. 51). While this did not directly affect control of the
strait, it did have important implications further south, in the Beagle
Channel, as noted above.
3. The Drake Passage
The 600-mile wide Drake Passage between Cape Horn, the
southernmost tip of the South American continent and the South Shet-
land Islands that are located at the northern tip of the Antarctic Penin-
sula, has also received attention in South American geopolitical writing
as an important "choke point." Its strategic significance, also acknowl-
edged by the United States, derives from its status as the passageway
between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988,
pp. 190-191)
In the event of a closure of the Panama Canal, the Drake Pas-
sage would become the primary inter-ocean link. The passage has con-
flict potential to the north as well as the south. To the north lies the
Beagle Channel, where control has historically been a point of contention
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between Argentina and Chile. Added to this is now the ocean area
claimed by both countries within their respective EEZs. Competing
Antarctic claims between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom lie to
the south, as all three claim the portion of the Antarctic continent
containing the Palmer Peninsula (the southern landmass facing the
Drake Passage).
While t e passage width of 600 miles seems an unlikely choke
point, it should be noted that this is one of the most difficult areas to
navigate in the world; one-half of the waterway is closed by ice during the
winter months, thus restricting the effective area of navigation. (Child,
1988, p. 25)
4. The Atlantic Narrows
As a leading Brazilian geopolitician Carlos de Meira Mattos
defines it, the South Atlantic has three accesses or areas which link the
oceans: the southern passages linking the Atlantic and Pacific, the Cape
route linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the Natal-Dakar strait,
or Atlantic Narrows, providing passage between the north and south
Atlantic (de Meira Mattos in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 215-217). Despite
this rather broad (belying the term "narrows") expanse of 3,500 kilome-
ters, the latter proved to be an important passage during the Second
World War. The United States placed considerable emphasis on the nar-
rows because of a concern that the German occupation of France might
bring German military power to the French African colonies and, as a
result, German control over the eastern half of the narrows. With bases
on the west African coast, the Germans could then conceivably mount an
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offensive on the Western Hemisphere (Child, 1985, pp. 124-125). Nearly
50 years later, some of the actors have changed but the scenario is still
valid.
This passage is still the route for the majority of Middle East oil
shipments to North and South America and Europe. The oil crisis of
1973, coupled with the Cuban/Soviet involvement in Angola and avail-
ability of West African ports for the Soviets, gave rise to renewed interest
in South Atlantic security proposals discussed in the next section. (Child,
1985, p. 125)
There are some writings that suggest that the "threat" in the
South Atlantic is vague at best, since it would be difficult "to devise a
scenario in which the Soviet Union would attack the United States or
NATO by sinking crude oil carriers in the South Atlantic." (Schoultz,
1987, p. 197) This may not, however, be the only scenario which could
threaten the West from the south. As some contemporary naval thinkers
have pointed out, the colder waters of the southern ocean and Antarctica
could make ideal hiding places for Soviet submarines (Kelly in Kelly and
Child, 1988, ch. 7). This being a possibility, the Atlantic Narrows, how-
ever broad, becomes an area of strategic concern. One factor which can
not be ignored is the increase in Soviet ship days in the South Atlantic
and West African waters. In 1970, Soviet ship days numbered approxi-
mately 200; by 1980, however, the ship day count was up to 2,600
(Schoultz, 1987, p. 196). This increase, along with the marked rise in
Soviet fishing operations in the southern waters, adds up to a dramatic
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increase in Soviet presence. (de Meira Mattos in Kelly and Child, 1988,
pp. 220-221)
5. Cape of Good Hope
The Cape route between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans has
long been acknowledged as a "critical passage point." With the advent of
supertankers following the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the sea
lane around the southern tip of Africa became the primary route for
petroleum shipping between the Middle East oil fields and the West. Even
though the Suez Canal was subsequently re-opened, it could no longer
accommodate the larger oil-carrying vessels (Hayes, 1984, p. 225). Even
though it appears that the cape is a broad expanse, the actual transit
area is limited, since weather conditions preclude passage around the
continent more than 15 to 20 miles from shore.
South Africa has, since the British abandoned their "east of
Suez" strategy in the 1960s, adopted the role of protector of the cape sea
lane. It has been hampered in this endeavor by the lack of a credible
"blue water" fleet, due largely to the UN arms embargo. (Harrison in
Arlinghaus and Baker, 1986, pp. 154-155)
The major concern for the southern passage lies in the com-
modity flow. Perhaps the most significant commodity is Middle Eastern
oil passing around the Cape of Good Hope. While this route accounts for
only approximately 25% of the United States' imports, approximately
60% of Western European oil supplies travel this route. (Grabendorff and
Roett, 1985, pp. 170-171)
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The criticality of the South Atlantic passages lies in their poten-
tial impact on world trade flows as it transits between the oceans. The
contiguous nature of the oceans makes the security of these choke points
and passages essential because a disruption of any one of them has an
important potential impact on not only U.S. trade but international
commerce as well. Efforts to provide stability have prompted the U.S., as
well as the regional powers, at various times and in various ways, to ini-
tiate proposals and ventures which will ensure security in the area, such
as the Rio Treaty and the more recent Brazilian proposal for a South
Atlantic Zone of Peace.
These passages receive little notice, except when threatened, in
contrast to more visible and perhaps better-known passages like the
Panama and Suez Canals and the watery expanse between the United
States and Europe. Despite their relative obscurity, the passages between
the southern waterways take on increased importance whenever there is
the slightest hint of threat to one of the northern transit routes. Those
concerns at various times in the past have led to the formulation of
security arrangements and proposals to ensure continued stability in the
region.
C. SECURITY PROPOSALS AND COOPERATIVE VENTURES
1. The Rio Pact
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or the Rio
Treaty, as it is commonly known) created a mutual security system
intended to safeguard the Western Hemisphere from external aggression.
It was the first treaty of its kind in the sense that it was the first
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permanent alliance entered into by the United States. Arguably, it served
as a model for the North Atlantic Treaty (Rossi and Piano, 1980, pp. 213-
214). The treaty was signed by the United States and 20 Latin American
states. The central premise of this 1947 pact is the mutual security
clause in Article 3(1) which states that "an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all."
Implementation of any of the treaty provisions is determined by a Meet-
ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of
American States (OAS) or by the OAS Council (Thomas and Thomas,
1963, pp. 254-260). The Rio Treaty is incorporated into the Organization
of American States Charter by Article 25. The boundaries of the treaty,
defined in Article 4, extend from pole to pole, encompassing all of North
and South America.
There has been, however, no "permanent" military organization
in the hemisphere. The only entity even remotely resembling a permanent
military organization is the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). Estab-
lished under the auspices of the OAS Charter, the IADB is based in
Washington, D.C. The board is a political, rather than a military,
instrument. (Connell-Smith, 1966, pp. 102-122)
It has been infrequent that the IADB members have performed
any substantive function. The IADB did study the question of South
Atlantic security and produced the "Plan for the Defense of Inter-Ameri-
can Maritime Traffic" approved in 1959. The latter gave rise, in turn, to
the South Atlantic Maritime Area Command (referred to as CAMUS),
comprised of representatives from Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
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Argentina. CAMUS was to provide "an Integrated wartime command";
toward this end, Aflantic convoy and communications exercises are con-
ducted (Hurrell, 1986, p. 189). In practice, however, CAMUS serves more
as a vehicle for Brazilian-Argentine naval and maritime shipping coordi-
nation and does not extend much beyond the coastal sea lanes. (Child,
1985, p. 126)
2. Antarctic Treaty
Signed In Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1959 and entered
into force on June 23, 1961, the Antarctic Treaty was in essence the first
international agreement establishing a non-militarized and nuclear-free
zone (Joyner, 1989, pp. 83-44). The treaty, which encompassed the
region south of 600 south latitude, effectively "neutralized" the area for 30
years. Disputes concerning territorial claims and sovereignty rights were
suspended for this period of time and activities on the continent were
avowedly dedicated to strictly scientific, peaceful ventures (Articles I, II,
III). While no military bases or operations are permitted under the
Treaty's provisions (Article I), military personnel may be (and are) used to
man and support bases and expeditions.
Major provisions of the treaty provide for scientific research and
international cooperation (Article IX), ban nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radioactive waste (Article V), and outline inspection rights to
all stations/bases for the consultative members (Article VII). On the sub-
ject of territorial claims, those in existence at the time of the treaty, while
neither acknowledged nor denied, may not be extended, and new claims
are not permitted (Article IV). Decision-making or consultative authority
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on Antarctic matters is confined to those states which maintain
"substantial" scientific activity (Myhre, 1986, pp. 40-41). States which
support the principles of the treaty may apply for acceding status and, if
granted, may attend the general Consultative Meetings but do not have a
role in the decision-making process. Also, Acceding States may apply for
consultative status, which may be considered by Special Consultative
Meetings (Beck, 1986, pp. 149-151). Currently, 37 states are signatories
to the Antarctic Treaty.
The treaty itself has never undergone a formal amendment but
significant addenda or conventions have been declared to supplement the
Treaty: they are internationally recognized. The first of these was the
1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora; it was followed by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals in 1972 and the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (Beck, 1986, pp. 218-226). Treaty
issues and international concerns for the area are discussed in
Chapter IV.
3. South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO)
The idea for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) is one
which has existed for quite some time. Though support has waxed and
waned over the years, a consistent argument for the proposal is that it is
simply "logical." The initial proposal for the formation of a SATO came in
the aftermath of the Second World War, when defensive alliances were
being formed around the world. The "founding theme" for the creation of
this specific security system is based on "recognition of the South
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Atlantic's own identfty and the need to keep it isolated from East-West
tensions." (Russell in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 77) Furthermore, some
South American military authors saw the alliance as a means to fill what
they perceived as a "strategic vacuum" in the South Atlantic. (Child in
Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 192)
Like alliances everywhere, the proponents of SATO tend to be
most vocal when international attention, for whatever reason, is focused
on the South Atlantic region. The United States has favored the forma-
tion of SATO but, like other actors, its support has followed the tide of
international attention. With the arrival of the Reagan Administration,
there was a renewed emphasis on the consolidation of Western Hemi-
spheric security, marked by improved relations between the United
States and Latin America, and a resurgence of inter-American military
cooperation. Interest was revived when it was reported that then-Presi-
dential candidate Reagan said he "would favor a NATO-like treaty linking
the military-capable nations of South America with South Africa." (New
York Times, April 20, 1980, p. A16) The most often mentioned parties to
such an alliance have been Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa.
Brazilian support for the idea has generally been confined to the
military, but it is a country with a significant stake in South Atlantic
security. With the largest economy in South America and being the most
developed industrially, Brazil is heavily dependent on foreign trade and
expansion of its export markets. In addition, Brazil is heavily dependent
on foreign petroleum; nearly 85% of the country's needs are met by
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Middle Eastern oil crossing into the Atlantic via the Cape route. (Hayes,
1984, p. 227)
Adding to Brazil's stake in South Atlantic security was its decla-
ration of a 200-nautical-mile-wide exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
1970. Adherent status to the Antarctic Treaty in 1975 emphasized
Brazil's desire to participate in Antarctic resource exploration (Mericq,
1987, p. 70). The extension of its maritime interest, coupled with an
Antarctic interest, prompted a more ambitious Brazilian strategic vision
for the south Atlantic.
Despite increasingly important interests in the South Atlantic,
Brazil is not a proponent of a South Atlantic coalitional security pact.
Until the early 1970s, Brazil had always insisted that any defensive alli-
ance in the region be formed within the purview of the Rio Treaty and
thus include U.S. membership. Since that time, Brazil's pragmatic for-
eign policy and choice of a more outwardly oriented development model
have made the country's endorsement of a SATO unlikely. Though signif-
icant support exists within the military (specifically the Navy), the civilian
leadership and important business leaders have managed to halt any
move toward a formal security alliance that would include South Africa
(Child, 1985, pp. 37, 125-126). The primary argument against the forma-
tion of a SATO, aside from its presumed adverse political ramifications, is
that it would needlessly "militarize" the South Atlantic. (Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, Latin America, August 2, 1988, p. B2)
Argentina has been the most frequent Latin American propo-
nent of a SATO. Representatives from Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay
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were invited to Buenos Aires in May 1957 to discuss the proposal; the
meeting concluded with an agreement to conduct a series of training
exercises. Little resulted from this until the mid-1960s, when Argentina
and South Africa conducted joint, albeit small, naval exercises (Hurrell,
1986, pp. 180-181). The idea languished until the mid-1970s before it
was revived in response to an external threat perception. The revival
coincided with port visits by the South African navy to Argentina and
Brazil during the annual exercises with the United States known as
UNITAS. (Child in Munoz and Tulchin, 1984, pp. 123-124)
Support for SATO in Argentina, when voiced, was confined pre-
dominantly to military circles who saw it as a means of countering a
perceived Soviet influence in the region. With the return to civilian
government and democracy, the perceived "threat" posed by the Soviet
Union has given way to a perception of the Soviets as an important trade
partner and investor, as noted above. (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Latin America, June 12, 1986, p. D3)
South Africa has been the most consistent proponent of SATO.
Its foreign policy has always emphasized the country's strategic location
and importance to the West as "guardian"' of the cape route. The threat
posed to Western interests in southern Africa and the South Atlantic
from the increased Soviet presence and growing influence has been th-
cornerstone of the South African claims. (Indeed, South Africa has much
to gain from a superpower rivalry in the area.) An alliance with the Latin
American countries, aside from generating Important developments for
trade and investment, would provide the South African government a
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means to gain a positive status (as a member of a recognized alliance) in
the international community.
Despite the original "logic" of the proposal, some significant
political and practical obstacles stand in the way of success. Though
Argentina cautiously supports South African involvement, Brazil is ada-
mantly opposed to this type of link with the international outcast. In
addition, the perception of the threat to the region has shifted from the
Soviet Union to concern that an East-West rivalry will jeopardize South
Atlantic security. This change in threat perception is most noticeable in
the increased trade relations between the Soviet Union, B. azil, and
Argentina and the emphasis which each country has placed on continued
economic relations. (Vacs in Muhal-Leon, 1989, ch. 11; Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, November 24, 1988, p. 1; Latin American Weekly
Review, September 22, 1988, pp. 2-3)
4. South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPAC)
The South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation was origi-
nally a Brazilian proposal (A/41/143) made before the United Nations
General Assembly on October 27, 1986. The "Zone" was formally adopted
by UN Resolution 42/16, on November 10, 1987, and resulted in the dec-
laration of the waters between Africa and South America as a "Zone of
Peace." The United States cast the lone dissenting vote, basing its dissent
on the argument that such a zone would impose unacceptable restric-
tions on the freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage
under international law. (Washington Post, October 28, 1986, p. A18)
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The portion of the resolution which has generated the most
controversy pertains to the call for all states in all other regions, particu-
larly the "militarily significant" states, to respect the region as a zone of
peace, through the "reduction and eventual elimination of their military
presence," the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction, and the prevention of extension of extra-regional con-
flict into the region. (UKMIS NY Naval Message 102321Z OCT 86)
Besides being declared a nuclear free zone (NFZ). the area
would also be "demilitarized." Brazil has interpreted this to mean an area
in which extra-regional powers may not exert military power but where
regional actors are at liberty to maintain their military status. (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, September 29, 1986,
p. BI)
Regarding the non-nuclear aspect of the proposal, the U.S. posi-
tion on nuclear-free zones can be found in a State Department response
to the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. NFZs are favored by the
United States on the condition that they: (1) do not contradict existing
security arrangements, (2) include participation by all appropriate states,
(3) do not affect freedom of navigation or right of innocent passage as
allowed under international law, (4) are initiated by the region concerned,
(5) provide for verification, and (6) prohibit participants from developing
or otherwise possessing nuclear devices for whatever purpose.
(SECSTATE Washington DC Naval Message 050232Z SEP 86)
An ardent supporter of freedom of the seas and the right of
innocent passage, the United States rejects the tenets of the Zone of
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Peace and Cooperation proposal and voted against the initial UN Resolu-
tion for creating the South Atlantic Zone. Not deterred by the lack of U.S.
support, the principal countries of the region are continuing to move
toward consolidation of the proposal and international acceptance.
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, August 2, 1988,
p. B3)
Security schemes, to be effective, must bring with them the
political will of the governments and militarily capable forces in order to
retain credibility. The best proposals will be meaningless without the
enforcement capability. This capability is the focus of the following
section.
D. SOUTH ATLANTIC NAVAL CAPABILITIES
Michael Morris (1987) has compiled extensive statistics on the
inventory and capabilities of Third World navies and ranked them
according to naval capabilities, their reach, and naval aviation structure.
The resulting Third World naval "hierarchy," divided into four levels of
classification, seeks to account for both qualitative and quantitative
aspects of Third World national naval inventories. An initial quantitative
classification is derived from a country's inventory, including naval wea-
ponry and numbers and types of fighting ships and supply vessels. This
classification is then refined by applying qualitative factors, such as
employment expertise and the degree of support or back-up. Morris'
methodology allows for a more refined classification of naval capability
and precludes a misclassification of capability based solely on inventory.
37
Two additional classification stages are applied for further precision:
"indicators of naval power" and "national power base indicators." The
first, indicators of naval power, includes factors such as tonnage, naval
aviation, marines, coast guard organizations separate from the naval
structure, as well as domestic naval weaponry production capabilities.
The second, the national power base, is introduced as a corroborative
test for determining the validity of the first three stages. It provides a
means to determine whether a nation has a sufficiently large and diversi-
fied national power base to maintain a navy. (Morris, 1987, pp. 23-33)
Morris' ranking scheme produces a worldwide hierarchy of Third
World naval power, with ranking from one (the least capable) to six (the
most capable). Rank one ("token") navies are those that possess a formal
organizational structure with small coastal naval ships but little else in
naval capability (such as fast attack craft or naval aviation). These navies
are generally unable to patrol even national territorial waters and have
no capability in the EEZ. In addition, number one nations spend a rela-
tively small fraction of their national budgets for military purposes, and
their national infrastructures are such that there is a low probability for
movement into second rank status. (Morris, 1987, pp. 26. 33)
Rank two (constabulary) navies include navies that do not possess
major warships but do possess coastal patrol, fast patrol vessels, and
fast attack vessels. These navies do have some capability to protect
coastal waters (or the area out to approximately 12 nautical miles).
(Morris, 1987, pp. 26, 33-39)
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Rank three (inshore territorial defense) navies generally have the
more flexible corvettes rather than simply patrol craft and fast attack
vessels. Corvettes may be used as back-up enforcement of the EEZ (the
sea area beyond 12 nautical miles and up to 200 nautical miles). The
corvettes have proven more cost effective than the larger frigates, an
important consideration in the financially strapped economies of the
Third World. Rank three navies also would include in their inventories
one to five major warships (frigates) and/or submarines. (Morris, 1987,
pp. 25-26, 39-40)
Rank four navies are capable of offshore territorial defense and
include "major warships" such as destroyers, frigates, and submarines.
Generally, these navies possess a minimum of six to a maximum of 15
major warships and/or submarines and can project considerable territor-
ial defense up to the limit of the EEZ. Naval aviation includes helicopters
and possibly maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Morris notes that most of
the rank four navies include in their inventories vessels that are First
World "surplus" and, therefore, tend to exhibit quantity without commen-
surate quality. Additionally, rank four navies have a significant naval
aviation complement of helicopters and/or maritime reconnaissance
aircraft. (Morris, 1987, pp. 25, 31, 40-44)
The ability to project forces in seas adjacent to national territory as
well as beyond the EEZ are the capabilities that mark rank five navies.
Naval aviation is well represented, including helicopters, maritime recon-
naissance, and combat aircraft, and ship inventories contain more than
39
15 major combatants up to and including cruisers and/or submarines.
(Morris, 1987, pp. 25, 29, 31, 44-47)
The highest ranking in the Third World hierarchy is the rank six
fleet, which is capable of regional force projection as well as some ability
to project force into adjoining ocean basins. Morris notes that the most
prominent characteristic of rank six navies is the "diversity and depth of
their weaponry." (Morris, 1987, p. 47) These navies include almost all
categories of naval equipment and naval aviation (helicopters, maritime
reconnaissance, and combat aircraft) in their inventories as well as "fairly
comprehensive domestic arms production, numerous supply ships and
miscellaneous vessels, and aircraft carriers." (Morris, 1987, pp. 25, 29,
31, 47-52)
For the purpose of this study, the capabilities of the Argentine and
Brazilian navies will be reviewed as South Atlantic powers. Though not
considered Third World, the capabilities of the South African navy will be
reviewed as it impacts on the region and because the region has signifi-
cant strategic and security implications for the country. The Chilean
navy is included, as well, as an important South American rank five navy
with a significant adjacent force projection capability. Chile must also be
included because of its South Atlantic link through its Antarctic claims.
1. Argentina
Argentina is second of three top naval powers in South America
and has a rank six navy, capable of regional force projection. The naval
inventory includes a large and diverse complement of ships, both major
combatants and light vessels, as well as an aircraft carrier. Its naval
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aviation capability is significant and includes a carrier-bome attack force
(Morris, 1987, p. 199). Despite its economic constraints, Argentina has
been able to sustain an "impressive program for naval modernization and
expansion." (Morris, 1987, p. 199) The country has a well-developed
indigenous military and naval armament industry which dates from the
1960s. By the late 1970s, the Argentine arms industry was developed to
a point that it began exporting light armored vehicles and small aircraft.
Though much of the Argentine armaments were produced as joint
ventures or under license, it has produced some indigenous designs,
such as the Pucara aircraft. (Wesson, 1986, p. 99)
The Argentine naval construction industry is manufacturing a
corvette, the German-designed MEKO Type- 140, as well as the German-
designed diesel-electric submarine, the TR-1700 (Scheina, 1987, p. 37).
More recently, Argentina has entered into joint ventures with Brazil to
produce military equipment under the economic integration agreements
between the two countries. The most significant undertaking is the pro-
duction of a "fast breeder" nuclear reactor, which has important implica-
tions for the development of nuclear submarines for both countries
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, September 19,
1986, p. D1). Despite the cancellation of the nuclear submarine program
by President Alfonsin in August 1988, there does not appear to be a simi-
lar across-the-board reduction in the joint nuclear research field between
the two countries. (Scheina, 1989, p. 127)
Among the other Argentine-Brazilian joint ventures is the
Parana, a light transport aircraft, and the purchase of 30 Brazilian-made
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Tucano trainer aircraft (Scheina, 1987, p. 37). Argentina, along with
Brazil, is far above all other states in the region in terms of the national
power indicators developed by Morris. These include land area, extent of
EEZ, GNP, the degree of industrialization, population, military expendi-
ture, and the size of the armed forces and merchant marine. This has
enabled Argentina to support its sizeable military construction industry
and lessen its dependence on foreign imports. (Morris, 1987, p. 202)
Argentina devotes more than two percent of its GNP to military
expenditures (Morris, 1987, p. 203). The Alfonsin government was com-
mitted to a reduction in military expenditures following the Malvinas
experience in favor of budgetary increases In the social sector. It is
uncertain whether this trend will continue with the Menem government
because a key plank of its campaign platform was the reclamation of the
Malvinas Islands. Roundly criticized for his initial remarks, Menem
softened the tone but maintained the basic goal of future uncontested
Argentine sovereignty over the islands (Latin American Regional Reports-
Southern Cone, March 9, 1989, p. 7). Since the military inventory largely
has not recovered from the losses of the Falklands/Malvinas War, it is
doubtful that Argentina could sustain an assault on the "Fortress Falk-
lands," which the United Kingdom has reinforced since the South
Atlantic conflict.
Argentina maintains a narrow lead in the nuclear power arena,
but this is quickly diminishing with the Brazilian surge in this area.
There is a capability to produce nuclear weapons, but as yet there has
been no move to do so.
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As in the economic field, Argentina and Brazil have moved
toward integration in nuclear development and have established joint
research facilities as well as reciprocal inspection rights (Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, Latin America, September 19, 1986, p. D1). In
the conventional military area, Morris notes that Argentina traditionally
has compensated for its second-place position behind Brazil in quantity
with a qualitative superiority. (Morris, 1987, p. 206)
In the wake of the South Atlantic War, Argentina redefined avia-
tion missions and assigned strategic air transport and tactical interdic-
tion to the air force. Naval aviation retains the missions of maritime air
reconnaissance, maritime traffic control, sea operations involving heli-
copters, and, naturally, anti-submarine warfare operations. (Scheina,
1989, p. 127)
The most significant development in the Argentine navy is the
overhaul of its aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo. The two-year
project will include major engine work, including new boilers and steam
turbines, which will increase the carrier's speed capability and reduce
the manning requirement. (Scheina, 1989, p. 127)
The Argentines have concluded an important agreement with
the West German firm, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werfte (HDW). HDW,
which earlier had furnished the Type-209 submarines in the Argentine
inventory, has supplied the third-generation TR- 1700 diesel-electric sub-
marine. This boat was designed and built specifically for ocean opera-
tions and incorporates advanced hydrotechnology normally found only in
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nuclear submarines. The first unit was delivered to the Argentines in
December 1984 and a second in January 1986. (Wixler, 1989, p. 86)
Four additional units are scheduled but will be built at the
Argentine Astillero Ministro Domecq Garcia shipyard, which the Germans
helped establish and in which they hold a 25 percent ownership (Wixler,
1989, p. 87). Perhaps the most important element in the purchase of the
TR-1700 for the Argentines is the method employed by the Germans in
the sale of their product. The Argentines will not only receive a more
modem and capable product with which to upgrade their naval capabili-
ties but they will also receive the technology to produce the platform
itself. The German firm routinely uses methods such as technology and
technical sharing as well as coproduction arrangements. Argentina has
received important technology as well as assistance in establishing an
important new shipbuilding facility (Wixler, 1989, pp. 95-97). These are
critical considerations to a country which perceives a maritime threat
from three sides (Chile from the west Brazil from the north, and the
United Kingdom from the east via the Falklands) in addition to acknowl-
edging the need for significant industrial/technological means for gener-
ating an export commodity.
It is expected that Argentine naval capabilities will remain near
constant and retain parity with Brazil. Argentina's economic development
strategy traditionally has been focused toward achieving a "great power"
status, much like Brazil's. The country's maritime interests also are sig-
nificant and are deeply rooted in geopolitical thought; therefore, it can be
expected that Argentina will continue to place great emphasis on naval
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capability and development (Morris, 1987, pp. 207-208). Economic con-
straints notwithstanding, the Argentine navy appears determined to con-
tinue its program of modernization and expansion.
Argentina's strategic goals have a specific maritime dimension.
The traditional desire for "great power" status, control of a large segment
of the South Atlantic (including the Falldand/Malvinas Islands) as well as
the southern passages, and sovereignty over a segment of Antarctica all
point to this continued emphasis of maritime strength.
2. Brazil
Though traditionally concerned with consolidating its national
territory, Brazil nonetheless possesses a large, well-developed naval
force. It is a rank six navy with a regional power projection capability.
Brazil's inventory includes an aircraft carrier and a sizeable naval avia-
tion arm even though, unlike Argentina's, Brazil's attack aircraft are not
carrier-borne.
Brazil possesses a well-developed military armaments industry
like Argentina, but its export sector far exceeds Argentina's. Though
naval production is the least-well-developed sector of its military indus-
try, the country has been able to export some indigenously built naval
vessels, including patrol boats to Chile (Morris, 1987, pp. 207, 210). With
its vast territory and natural resources, Brazil is able to sustain its indig-
enous military construction industries and has not had to rely on naval
imports, as have most other South American nations.
The Brazilian naval complement is approximately 25 percent of
the total South American inventory, with all types of naval vessels
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represented, but its problem of obsolescence is not likely to be overcome,
given the 1988 budget reductions. The modernization of the British-built
Oberon submarines has been placed on hold, as has the upgrading of the
World War II era U.S. carrier, the Minas Gerais. In addition, 12 planned
Inhauma class frigates have been reduced to four (Scheina, 1989,
p. 128). The older U.S. ships, obtained after the Second World War and
up to the early 1970s, are being phased out as the Garcia class frigates
(ex-U.S. FF-1040 class) become active. Four of these frigates were
acquired in 1989 along with one (ex-LSD-28) dock landing ship from the
United States. (Scheina, 1990, p. 112)
The newer warships in the inventory have a greater inshore/
offshore territorial capability as well as limited blue-water potential
(Morris, 1987, p. 209). This allows the Brazilian forces to patrol the
coastal sea as well as the extensive inland river waterways. Like other
South American navies, however, Brazil currently does not have naval
vessels for the specific mission of EEZ patrol and enforcement. (Morris,
1987, p. 210)
An indigenous nuclear submarine construction program
remains a priority project for the navy, but it too has not escaped the
funding constraints. Initially projected for the early 1990s, the first boat,
NAC-1, is now not expected to enter service until approximately 2010
(Scheina, 1990, p. 112). The German-designed Type- 1400 submarine was
delivered during the summer 1988 with three more units of the class
scheduled to be built at Brazilian facilities. Following their completion, a
Brazilian-designed submarine is scheduled. (Scheina, 1989, p. 128)
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The Brazilians also have benefited from choosing the German
submarines over the other competitors because the contract, like Argen-
tina's, includes the transfer of submarine design and construction tech-
niques (Pesce, 1989, p. 64). This will enable the Brazilians to undergo the
important "learning experience" before proceeding with the construction
of their own designs.
In addition to the numerous economic cooperative ventures
between Argentina and Brazil, the two countries have undertaken a joint
project to develop a fast-breeder reactor, as mentioned previously. The
implications of this project, particularly if early success is secured, are
far-reaching. Neither country Is in a position to sustain unilaterally the
financial burden required to construct a nuclear submarine, and produc-
ing only a few units in addition to providing support facilities. However,
bilateral cooperation on such a project might well make the venture cost-
effective for both (Pesce, 1989, pp. 65-66). One can not overlook the tra-
ditional rivalry between the two countries, and it continues to strain
relations at times, but there are signs that this traditional rivalry is giv-
ing way to "friendly competition." (Selcher in Atkins, 1990, p. 94)
3. Chile
Chile has a rank five navy and has traditionally placed great
emphasis on naval power. Though It lays claim to the status of a South
Pacific power, with maritime interests in the South Atlantic through its
Antarctic claims, the Chilean navy has not been tested since the conclu-
sion of the War of the Pacific of 1879-1883. Chilean geopolitics stress the
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responsibility for protecting the South Pacific area encompassed by the
Rio Treaty; for this, significant naval and air power is required.
As a rank five navy, Chile is capable of territorial defense as well
as the projection of force beyond the EEZ and into seas adjacent to its
claimed national maritime sea zones. The naval inventory includes cruis-
ers, destroyers, and frigates as well as light forces.
Chile's national power indicators are not nearly as strong as
those of Brazil and Argentina, particularly because of its geographical
peculiarities and population distribution. But they are nonetheless well
defined and fall in the middle range along with Peru. Like the top two
naval powers of South America, Chile also supports an indigenous naval
construction industry, but it is not as developed as Argentina's or
Brazil's. Small surface craft hull construction is undertaken by Chilean
shipbuilding facilities but they rely on licensing agreements with devel-
oped nations, chiefly France, and must import engines, electronic equip-
ment, and armaments to complete the product. Furthermore, Chile has
very little indigenous naval design capability (Morris, 1987, pp. 78-79).
Despite these handicaps, Chile has built the navy yard at Talcahuano
into a major fleet support facility as well as a facility for the construction
of minor warships and auxiliaries and overhauling and repairing its more
advanced units, including submarines (Scheina, 1988, p. 33). The most
dynamic in the region, the Chilean Navy built a new naval air facility at
Vina del Mar in 1989 and upgraded the Fourth Zone (which extends from
260 south latitude to the Peruvian border) to counter smuggling
activities. (Scheina, 1990, p. 113)
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The Chilean naval aviation complement includes most categor-
ies of aircraft: helicopters and combat aircraft (Morris, 1987, p. 31). In
early 1989, the Chilean navy secured a contract for ten French-designed
aircraft to be built in Indonesia. The ten included eight helicopters and
two maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, a squadron of Chilean air force
C-101M Halcon maritime strike aircraft, armed with anti-ship missiles, is
to be transferred to the navy (Scheina, 1989, p. 129). Though the Chilean
navy possesses a strong naval aviation complement, it still lacks an
aircraft carrier but has studied the possibility of converting the former
cruiser O'Higgins (ex-USS Brooklyn [CL-401) into a helicopter carrier.
Economic constraints, however, have precluded this move. (Scheina,
1988, p. 33)
With the economic upswing, Chile plans more upgrades by
1994. These improvements include obtaining two additional Leander-
class frigates, two Type-209 submarines, and four ex-Israeli Reshev-class
missile boats. (Scheina, 1990, p. 113)
Despite periods of economic austerity, the Chilean navy has
always been assured of its fair share of the military expenditures. This
may be attributed to the nation's strong maritime tradition and the natu-
ral tendency to provide for a navy in a nation with an extensive, approxi-
mately 3,000-mile coastline (Morris, 1987, p. 84). In addition, Chilean
claims in Antarctica naturally expand the importance of the navy and
project Chilean maritime interests into the Atlantic Ocean.
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4. South Africa
The South African navy is the most developed in sub-Saharan
Africa. Though it has declined in recent years, it is still the primary naval
force in the region. Classed as a rank three naval power by Morris' cate-
gorization, it is not considered a Third World state but rather an enclave,
developed state, like Australia and New Zealand. (Morris, 1987, pp.
34-35)
Like other rank three navies, South Africa is most concerned
with inshore territorial defense. For this mission, the navy employs a frig-
ate, nine guided-missile equipped patrol combatants, five patrol boats,
coastal patrol minesweepers, and several auxiliaries and harbor defense
vessels. (Meason, 1987, p. 62)
The South African submarine force operates the French Daphne
class diesel, the youngest of which is 16 years old. There was considera-
ble controversy when the West German shipbuilders Howaldtswerke
Deutsche Werft (HDW) and Ingenieurkontor Lubeck (IKL) reportedly sold
the South Africans the blueprints for the Type-209 diesel-electric subma-
rine in 1986. This represented the first attempt at foreign submarine
acquisition since the 1977 UN-imposed embargo which cancelled the
French Agosta class submarines. Despite a presumed lack of expertise
and technology which makes such a construction project unlikely, the
South African government has declared that the submarine program is
progressing, and that the first unit is scheduled for delivery in the early
1990s (Meason, 1988, p. 75). One factor which should not be overlooked
is the Chilean connection. The two countries' arms industries continued
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to expand ties during 1989. While co-production thus far has been in
small arms, contacts exist in the shipbuilding industry as well, specifi-
cally through Sandock-Austral Shipyards, a Joint Chilean-South African
venture. (Scheina, 1990, p. 113)
In contrast to the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Africa has an established, tested navy. It possesses well-trained forces
which have benefited from a long association with the British. Under the
Simonstown Agreement, the British and South African navies conducted
joint operations for the security of the cape route and in support of
British operations in the Indian Ocean and south Atlantic. (Nelson, 1981,
p. 335)
When the British withdrew from an "east of Suez" strategy in
the 1960s, the task of defending the cape route fell to the South Africans
alone. Without the support of the British and in addition to the UN arms
embargo on the country, South Africa's fleet modernization program was
effectively halted, as was the development of a credible blue-water
capability. (Harrison in Arlinghaus & Baker, 1986, pp. 154-155)
A cursory view of the Latin American and South African Navies
yields a mixed review. While Chile alone has managed to advance its
naval capabilities, it is still far from sufficient to dominate the southern
region. Brazil, too, has significant capabilities for close-in protection, yet
lacks the reach of a true "blue water" fleet. Argentina has yet to recover
fully the losses of the South Atlantic conflict and, owing to the country's
economic difficulties, it does not appear that she will do so in the near
future. Only recently has South Africa been able to reach beyond her
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borders for cooperative ventures to stimulate her defense industry. These
moves toward joint ventures with Chilean defense industries are too
recent to create the depth required to sustain a successful, long-term,
indigenous defense industry.
While the individual navies may not yet be capable of seriously
challenging a first-rate navy on the high seas, they do possess sufficient
capabilities to harass and disrupt operations and/or passage in transit
lanes in their regions. Capability, however, may not equate to action.
There must also be the political will to take such a course of action.
Whether disruptive actions are undertaken may be a function associated
with the geopolitical thinking in a given country. One area which could
conceivably generate new tensions is the Antarctic. Largely out of public
view, this region is generating renewed interest and forcing old and new
rivals to examine its value relative to individual national interests.
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M. ANTARCTICA AND COMPETING INTERESTS
Child asserts that: "A number of converging circumstances suggest
that Antarctica may be a major object of geopolitical attention.. .in the
decade to come." (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 187) This is based on
the observation that some of the long-standing rivalries and/or conflicts
have found resolution or have decreased in priority relative to other
issues and, therefore, tensions in the region have lessened. While the
trend toward regional integration and conflict resolution appears to be
strong, the basis of contention between the nations of the Southern
Cone, complicated by extraregional actors, is far from settled.
Many writers have noted the inextricable link between the conflicts
of the Southern Cone and those of Antarctica. Those conflicts involve
competing territorial claims as well as control of maritime space. As
attention is focused on the southern continent and its potential
resources, the move to secure claims and rights intensifies. The principal
rivalry is between Argentina and Chile, but the disputes between Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas also have a
significant impact on Antarctic territorial sovereignty issues. In addition,
Brazil and Uruguay have renewed their interest in the "frozen continent."
The countries of the Southern Cone are not the only players in the
quest for Antarctic control. Several other actors, including extracontinen-
tal powers, have important positions which require protection (see map
in Appendix C).
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A. TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES AND COMPETING ANTARCTIC
CLAIMS
While territorial claims elsewhere in the world, by and large, have
international recognition, either by legal means or by undisputed tradi-
tional claim, this is not the case in Antarctica. The basis of Antarctic
claims falls broadly into four categories: geographical proximity (in the
case of Chile and Argentina); terra communis or "common land," which is
the theme of the Gondwana Theory; the right of discovery, as in the case
of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union (the U.S.
and USSR have not made claims but reserve the right to do so at some
time in the future); and utt possidetis juris, or the retention of lands or
territories gained by victory in war or conflict.
1. Brazil
Brazil and Argentina have long been rivals for supremacy on the
South American continent. This rivalry, which can be dated back more
than 500 years to their Spanish-Portuguese conflicts, has extended to
the Antarctic continent as well. While Argentina bases its claims on vari-
ous approaches, ranging from the strategic to the geological, Brazil has
settled on a more contemporary theory for the basis of its challenge.
The Brazilian concept of defrontacao, the "facing" or Frontage
Theory, proposes a division of the South American quadrant of Antarctica
into sectors based on the unobstructed "projection" of six South Ameri-
can countries facing the southern continent. Under this concept, the
Chilean and Argentine claims are reduced by a significant amount with a
large segment awarded to Brazil, and lesser awards to Uruguay, Peru,
and Ecuador (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 195-196). It is
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interesting to note that these countries previously have had little interest
in Antarctica but, should they support the Brazilian plan, this could
change. The plan naturally appeals to Brazilian geopoliticians but, as
Child points out, "it undermines the Argentine sovereignty claim (as well
as the Chilean)." While no serious suggestion is made as to sovereignty,
the Frontage Theory hopes to garner support by trying to weaken the
Argentine-Chilean claims through the inclusion of other South American
nations. Whatever role this theory may take, there is one positive aspect:
it serves to strengthen the "Latin American condominium idea under
which Brazil would play a major role as the emerging regional power."
(Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 195-197)
Brazil conducted its first solo Antarctic research venture in mid-
January 1986. University of Sao Paulo's oceanographic ship Professor
Bemard, with an all-Brazilian crew and staff, conducted a three-month-
long study on sea bottom fish as well as continued studies on krill
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, January 15,
1986, p. D1). With the trend toward integration becoming more wide-
spread in the Southern Cone countries, particularly Argentina and
Brazil, Antarctica may prove to be yet another arena for cooperative
ventures.
2. Argentina
The Argentine-Chilean continental competition also has
extended to the Antarctic continent. In several ways, sovereignty claims
on the South American continent and maritime control issues are inex-
tricably linked to the claims on the Antarctic continent. Even school chil-
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dren are taught that their country consists of three interlinked parts: the
mainland, Antarctic, and insular Argentina. (Child, 1988, p. 65)
The Argentine Antarctic claim extends south from 600 south
latitude between 250 and 740 west longitude. This area is completely
encompassed within the United Kingdom's claim and approximately one-
half of the territory is overlapped by the Chilean claim. (Beck, 1986,
p. 119)
Argentina poses exacting rights and claims on the Antarctic
continent. Proximity, as well as history, geological affinity, plus host of
rescue and administrative activities and effective occupation, are the
means by which Argentina strengthens its claims (including settlements,
postal and radio operations, scientific research facilities, the mainte-
nance of a civil registry, among others). But Argentina is presented with
another problem. As Child notes:
There seems to be a growing realization that making good an Antarc-
tic sovereignty claim is not very realistic and may alienate a number
of important allies whose support is needed on the Malvinas issue.
(Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 194)
Both Argentina and Chile also rely on the principle of uti pos-
sidetisjuris to support further their Antarctic claims. Under this princi-
ple, widely recognized and accepted in the region, the country is the legal
heir to the possessions of the Spanish crown in the former Viceroyalty of
Rio de la Plata. The Spanish rights date from the Papal bulls of 1493 and
the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal in 1494. The trea-
ties "divided" the New World between the Spanish and the Portuguese;
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the dividing line was agreed to be "370 leagues west of the Cape Verde
Islands." (Child, 1988, p. 68)
Not to leave any doubt of its ownership intent or to be outdone
by its rival and neighbor, Argentina has stepped up its Antarctic pres-
ence. With the deployment of assets to Antarctica from December 1986
through March 1987, Argentina sought to become the leading presence
on the continent. Five new temporary scientific bases were established
during this time, which gave Argentina the greatest number of Antarctic
bases (16) of all the treaty members. (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Latin America, December 23, 1986, p. B3)
3. Chile
The Chilean Antarctic Territory (CAT) encompasses the area and
seas between 530 and 900 west longitude, as defined by Supreme Decree
No. 1747 of 6 November 1940, and includes all lands, islands, islets,
reefs, glaciers, seas, straits, and canals which lie within those
boundaries. (Mericq, 1987, pp. 81-82)
The concept of a -tricontinental"' Chile also plays an important
role in Chile's Antarctic claims. Under this concept, Chilean territorial
space is three-fold: the continental, which consists of the land on the
South American continent; the insular; and the Antarctic, and all are tied
together by the Chilean Sea. (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 197)
Proximity plays an important function in both Argentine and
Chilean claims. Chile is in the better position under this concept by
virtue of its possession of Diego Ramirez and Cape Horn Islands.
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Despite the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, there still
remains a strong Chilean opposition to the demarcation of the Cape Horn
meridian (670 15' west longitude) as the dividing line between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. This point of contention plays a crucial role in the
support of the easternmost boundary of the Chilean Antarctic claim.
Under Chilean geopolitical thought, the more logical divisor follows the
"natural" boundary defined by the arc of the Southern Antilles. This arc
marks geological and oceanographic continuity and would strengthen the
Chilean claim to the area east of the Cape Horn meridian to 530 west
longitude. (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 197)
4. The United Kingdom
By virtue of its possessions in the South Atlantic, chiefly the
Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich, and South Orkney Islands,
the United Kingdom claims the Antarctic sector from 200 to 800 west
longitude south of 600 south latitude (Beck, 1986, p. 122). The British
claim considerably overlaps the Chilean one and completely encompasses
the Argentine claim.
The United Kingdom also employs the principle of -effective
occupation" as well as discovery rights. Discovery rights are exercised by
virtue of the discovery of the Antarctic landmass in 1820-21 by Edward
Bransfield and exploration in 1908 when the British created the Falkland
Island Dependencies. The specific dimensions of the British South Atlan-
tic claims were delineated in 1970, and the continental Antarctic claims
(named the British Antarctic Territory) were specified in 1962. (Beck,
1986, p. 122)
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Latin American opposition to British claims is keen. Argentina
and Chile both contend that the territory which the United Kingdom
claims is rightfully theirs by uti possidetisjuris, which dates to a papal
bull of 1493. and voids later claims by other countries. The British
counter that uti possidetisjuris is a regional custom and, as such, is sub-
ordinate to international law (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, p. 204).
Therefore, the islands and Antarctic territory were res nufis, i.e., belong-
ing to no one, when the British laid their claims.
5. Other Claims
The Australian claim is the largest Antarctic claim and encom-
passes the area south of 600 south latitude between 1600 and 450 east
longitude. A small sector, between 1360 and 1420 east longitude, is
claimed by France (Beck, 1986, pp. 119-121). It is noteworthy that this
claim between two countries is not "overlapping," as in the case of the
United Kingdom-Argentine-Chilean claims, but rather an uncontested,
shared claim between the two countries.
The Australian government has been quite firm in its refusal to
renounce its Antarctic claim, which was inherited from the United King-
dom in 1933. This region was placed under Australian administration at
that time, except for the narrow wedge which was already claimed by
France with British acknowledgement.
The Antarctic region known as Adelie Land was formally
claimed by France in 1924. Originally defined as the territory between
1360 and 1420 east longitude and between the 660 and 670 south lati-
tude, France's claim was extended in 1938 to include the entire territory
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south of 600 south latitude between the 136th and 142nd meridians east
longitude (Beck, 1986, p. 121). France has opposed any move which
would restrict its sovereignty claims, but it has supported the move
regarding international regulation of scientific activities.
New Zealand's Antarctic involvement began in 1923, when the
United Kingdom first laid claim on the continent. The region known as
the Ross Dependency, from 1600 east longitude to 1500 west longitude
and south from 600 south latitude, was placed under New Zealand's
administration (Beck, 1986, pp. 121-122). Despite the country's proxim-
ity to the continent, New Zealand has not opposed the idea of an interna-
tionalization of Antarctica.
On 14 January 1949, Norway officially laid claim to its share of
Antarctic territory, but Its Involvement began earlier, in 1939-1941,
when the country claimed the Peter I and Bouvet Islands. Norwegian
territorial claims include the coastal area between 200 west longitude and
450 east longitude. (Beck, 1986, p. 122)
Non-claimant nations which also have interests on the conti-
nent include the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Belgium,
Japan, West Germany, Poland, and India, as well as Brazil. Each of these
countries maintains some type of presence, and some have undertaken
joint ventures with other nations.
The United States can claim one of the longest Antarctic tradi-
tions as well as one of the largest presences. Its Antarctic tradition dates
from extensive scientific research conducted before 1957 as well as the
"discovery," in 1820-2 1, by Nathaniel Palmer.
60
The Soviets, too, could have a basis for claims. Among the earli-
est explorers in the southern region was Fabian von Bellinghausen. Con-
troversy still exists on the matter of first discovery, since the Soviet
Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom all claim to have been
the first to discover Antarctica during 1820-21.
B. COMPETING INTERESTS
The interest In the southern continent and Its potential Is not a new
phenomenon; several writers contend that the Antarctic Treaty itself was
a product of the interest and potential conflict over the continent in the
mid- 1950s. As Child notes, several circumstances have served to focus
attention on the area in the past few years: the resolution of many tradi-
tional tensions, the strengthening of Latin American solidarity in the
wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War, the presumed resource potential of
Antarctica, and the misconception that there is a critical time factor
associated with the Antarctic Treaty (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp.
187-] 88). In actual fact, Child notes, the first two circumstances are eas-
fly verifiable, but the third and fourth circumstances are not. These sit-
uations will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sectionO,.
Regardless of the reasons, interest has in fact increased, and members
and non-members alike are moving to secure their individual interests.
International proposals surrounding the Antarctic future fall broadly
into four categories: sovereignty or territorial, internationalization, "world
park," and resource exploitation issues. While the individual countries
have specific interests which may be furthered by the acceptance of one
or another of the proposals, several blocks or groupings have already
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formed around the different proposals. These four categories are not the
only possibilities for Antarctica's future, rather, they are the general
areas, with some of the specific proposals falling within (or in some
cases, between) the categorizations.
1. Sovereignty
The issue of jurisdiction and ownership in Antarctica has been
debated longer than the treaty regime itself. With seven nations claiming
sovereignty over segments of the continent, the situation could become
heated should the Treaty System undergo review after 1991. Since it is
doubtful that any of the claimant states would be willing to forego their
claims, the potential for conflict could increase as the probability of the
treaty breakdown increases. As one might conclude from the earlier dis-
cussion, the issue has significant political as well as legal aspects which
require resolution.
The several interstate rivalries over territory are complicated by
disagreements over an acceptab' - means of supporting claims in the
area. The historical basis of claiming sovereignty includes the right of
discovery; if the newly discovered land was res nullis (belonging to no
one), the discoverer could claim the territory in the name of his sovereign
(Child, 1988, pp. 15-16). Traditionally, international law has stressed
.effective occupation" as the primary basis for supporting discovery
claims. The legitimacy of this criterion has been questioned, however, in
the case of the polar regions, where geography and climate have pre-
cluded long-term occupation (Beck, 1986, pp. 113-115). In an attempt to
satisfy this requirement, claimant nations have undertaken numerous
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activities to prove effective occupation, from a year-round presence to
establishing settlements in the claimed areas. Various administrative
functions, both on the continent and at home, are also used to further
the premise of a direct link between the claimant state and Antarctica.
These range from establishing civil registries in Antarctica to various
executive orders and issuing postage stamps depicting Antarctic claims
as a part of national territory. (Child, 1988, pp. 72-74, 111-112)
Discovery and effective occupation are not the only bases for
claims. Several peripheral theories in support of claims have been
advanced, including inheritance, contiguity, and proximity. Argentina,
Chile, Australia, and New Zealand all advance sovereignty arguments
based on multiple methods. (Beck, 1986, pp. 119-122)
Examining the sovereignty claims from a legal point of view,
many do not stand up. Argentine and Chilean claims are premised on
four points: uti possidetisjuris, proximity/contiguity, geological affinity,
and effective occupation. The first is based on inheritance of the original
Spanish rights, but since Spain had neither discovered nor occupied the
continent, it can be questioned whether Spain ever had the right to
Antarctica. The claim supported by proximity/contiguity thesis is not
supported in international law, and, given the 600-700 mile distance
between Argentine/Chilean continental territory and the Antarctic Penin-
sula, "proximity" takes on an overly broad and ambiguous meaning. Geo-
logical affinity is based on the theory of the ancient super-continent of
Gondwanaland. Recent geological surveys have largely disproved the
theory that the Andes-Transantarctic Mountain chain was once
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connected. Effective occupation may have some merit, since both the
Argentines and Chileans have gone to great lengths to maintain a pres-
ence, but the range of their Antarctic involvement is probably not suffi-
cient to justify the expanse of their claims. (Myhre, 1986, pp. 12-13)
The remaining claimant states have a relatively firm basis for
their claims. The United Kingdom advanced its claim in 1908 and refined
the limits of the territory involved in 1917. The claim is based on discov-
ery and exploration, and subsequent effective occupation. Britain's claim
was the first to be advanced on the Antarctic continent. Australia and
New Zealand have each advanced claims by British Order-in-Council in
1933 and 1923, respectively. While Australia has undertaken significant
exploration of its own, New Zealand operates in close cooperation with
the United States. For both these countries, the "degree" of effective
occupation may not justify the extent of their claims. (Myhre, pp. 13-15)
France did not advance its Antarctic claim until 1924, though
French discovery has been dated to 1837-40. The French claim is small
and, therefore, more defensible under effective occupation. Norway's
claim is unique among the territorial claims because it encompasses only
the coastal region and not a "sector" extending to the Pole. It, too, has a
strong basis for Its claim, based on discovery and effective occupation.
(Myhre, 1986, p. 15)
2. Internationalization
An alternative to the Treaty System that has gained wide sup-
port among the developing nations of the Third World is the "Pan Antarc-
tic" movement, which proposes to open the continent to all countries as
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the "heritage of all mankind." While New Zealand, alone among the
claimant states, lends support to this idea (it was New Zealand which
first proposed this shortly after World War II, [Myhre, 1986, p. 14]),
opposition from other claimant states and the Antarctic Treaty members
would be formidable. (Child in Kelly and Child, 1988, pp. 201-202)
International attention on Antarctica has been increasing since
the early 1980s. Malaysia and Antigua and Barbuda, particularly, have
been extremely vocal as proponents of internationalization of the conti-
nent. In a 1983 letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
they requested that the "Question of Antarctica" be placed on the agenda
for the UN's 38th session. The subsequent resolution, sponsored exclu-
sively by a Third World group, called for the Secretary General to prepare
a study on Antarctica. (Myhre, 1986, p. 114)
The matter did not stop there. The following year, a similar reso-
lution was passed, calling for further study, and placed before subse-
quent assemblies. The resolution, passed by the 40th session in 1985,
called for the Secretary to update and expand the study, and placed the
subject on the agenda for the next session. More importantly, it
addressed the minerals regime negotiations, and specifically called for
the "equitable sharing of benefits." (Myhre, 1986, p. 115)
The demand for opening the continent to all nations is based on
new political and legal concepts and the belief that Antarctic matters are
too important to be decided by a select few. The legal concepts discussed
earlier, which call into question the traditional bases for most Antarctic
claims, are among the key arguments used by the "internationalists" to
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advance their proposal; the "club" approach of the Treaty System is to be
abandoned in favor of a more representative international regime. The
most frequently suggested replacement is a United Nations-based organi-
zation along the lines of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) precedent. This would create an authority (like the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority) which would assume responsibility for the
Antarctic continent and its resources. (Beck, 1986, p. 115)
3. World Park
Environmentalists oppose internationalization with as much
enthusiasm as they oppose Antarctic exploitation. They propose the elim-
ination of all means of exploration/exploitation in favor of turning the
continent into a huge ecological preserve.
The original proposal for establishing Antarctica as a "world
park" under the auspices of the United Nations stems from a resolution
passed at the 1972 World Conference on National Parks held in Wyo-
ming. Among the supporters of this view are the Friends of the Earth
organization based in New Zealand and Greenpeace International. (Beck,
1986, p. 222)
The entire treaty area, believe environmentalists, is a "special
conservation zone" which should be closed to mineral exploration and
exploitation activity and formally protected as an "international wildlife
sanctuary and science preserve." (Beck, 1986, p. 251) The world park
notion has regained momentum with the current emphasis on environ-
mental concerns globally.
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C. THE RESOURCES QUESTION
One of the potentially most explosive issues surrounding the Antarc-
tic Treaty System is the question of resource exploi t ation. Early explora-
tion which uncovered evidence of minerals has added to the argument.
Living and non-living resources are elements of the debate and have an
impact on existing rivalries, both within the treaty regime and between
the treaty regime and outside parties. The question is further compli-
cated by the sovereignty issue as well as conflicting theories over the
degree of resource potential and the current technological ability to
exploit that potential.
Early explorers reported mineral "occurrences," or traces of known
minerals, including titanium, copper, uranium, gold, coal, graphite,
molybdenum, silver, zinc, iron, tin, cobalt, nickel, and chromium (Beck,
1986, p. 239). Traces do not necessarily equate to economically exploita-
ble amounts; however, given the size of the continent (roughly the size of
the United States and Canada combined) and "indirect" evidence, one
estimate suggests that there may be more than 900 major mineral depos-
its, 20 of which could be located in the more accessible ice-free areas.
(Zumberge in Westermeyer, 1986, p. 36)
Indirect evidence advanced in the 1960s (derived from the
Gondwanaland theory of continental drift) provides the basis for the
majority of claims of non-renewable resources in Antarctica. Under this
theory, Antarctica was once connected to the South American, African,
Indian, New Zealand, and Australian land masses in one huge supercon-
tinent. It has been theorized that proven resources in these areas must
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have counterpart reserves in Antarctica. The Transantarctic mountains
have been connected to areas of Tasmania and eastern Australia, where
commercial grade deposits of zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, tin, silver, and
gold have been found (Mitchell and Tinker, 1980, p. 25). The Antarctic
Peninsula, a geologically compatible extension of the Andean Mountain
chain (where copper deposits exist in Chile), has yielded evidence of low-
grade copper mineralization, which indicates potential for further
exploration. (Westermeyer, 1986. p. 37)
No deposits of economic value have been found in Antarctica to date,
aside from coal and traces of gold, silver, and manganese. This does not
necessarily discount the probability of their presence as postulated under
the Gondwanaland theory; rather, it may be more a matter of the small
size of the surveyed area and the lack of appropriate technological capa-
bility. Only about two percent of the continent is ice-free, and less than
one percent has been explored for minerals. (Elliott in Shapley, 1985,
p. 127)
While on-going studies have not proven conclusively that minerals
exist in economically exploitable quantities, neither have they proven
that the mineral deposits do not exist. The promise of vast resources
keeps the more developed nations exploring; Australia, France, and the
Soviet Union are conducting surveys in East Antarctica, while the United
States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Norway, and West Germany are con-
ducting survey operations in the wider and more shallow continental
shelves of West Antarctica, as well as the Bellinghausen-Amundsen,
Ross, and Weddell Sea areas (Beck, 1986, p. 240). With estimates
68
ranging from little exploitable mineral potential to 50 billion barrels of oil
and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, exploration is not likely to
falter.
1. Non-Renewable Resources
Of the non-renewable resources already listed, only coal thus
far has been proven to exist in sizeable quantities. The coal, which has
been mapped in the Transantarctic Mountains, is known to be part of a
substantial deposit, and possibly represents the largest reserve in the
world (Beck, 1986, p. 239). The quality of this coal is another matter;
coal reserves in the other six continents would have to be exhausted
before the lower-grade Antarctic coal could be economically exploitable.
(Shapley, 1985, pp. 134-135)
Though oil has not been discovered in Antarctica, the Ross Sea
area appears to hold some potential, given the development of oil fields in
the once adjacent areas in the Bass Strait between Tasmania and Aus-
tralia and on Argentina's continental shelf adjacent to the Weddel Sea.
The potential for oil in the Bellingshausen Sea area was increased with
the Chilean announcement of an oil discovery in southern Tierra del
Fuego with an estimated daily production rate of 90 cubic meters
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 28, 1989, p. 20). Further
potential for oil deposits is hinted by the discovery of thick layers of
unmetamorphosed tertiary sediments (which frequently contain oil) in
the Antarctic sea areas. The presence of trace amounts of methane,
ethane, and ethylene, also often indicators of oil, was recorded in the
Ross Sea by the U.S. scientific drilling vessel Glomar Challenger in
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1972-1973. The tremendous interest in the Ross Sea area derives from
its former geological association with the Gippsland basin of Australia,
where extensive proven reserves of oil and natural gas are located.
(Shapley, 1985, pp. 124, 130)
Several other minerals besides the much-sought-after hydro-
carbons are presumed to be in the Antarctic. For example, the presence
of uranium is suggested by the similarities between parts of Australia,
South Africa, and Eastern Antarctica. Ferromanganese nodules discov-
ered offshore contained copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. (Wester-
meyer, 1984, p. 39)
The Transantarctic Mountains have been geologically linked to
the Adelaide region of Australia, which contains numerous deposits of
gold, copper-gold, barium, manganese, and lead-zinc-silver. The Dufek
Massif area at the northern edge of the Pensacola Mountains is a layered
intrusion originally identified by an International Geophysical Year (IGY)
group in 1957. Layered intrusions in other continents contain reserves of
platinum, nickel, copper, chromium, tin and gold (Shapley, 1985, pp.
134-138). Also recorded in the Transantarctic Mountains are copper,
lead, zinc, and gold. Molybdenum, malachite, gold, silver, nickel, cobalt,
chromium, and copper have been Identified in the course of geological
surveys of the Antarctic Peninsula; copper, molybdenum, tin, manga-
nese, uranium, and titanium have been identified in Greater (western)
Antarctica. (Parsons, 1987. pp. 83-86)
One last resource which should not be overlooked is fresh
water. The abundance of ice in Antarctica could conceivably provide a
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plentiful source of water for arid countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia. The feasi-
bility of exploitation of this resource is currently as limited as that of
Antarctica's other resources because of technological constraints.
(Westermeyer, 1984, p. 39)
2. Renewable Resources
Fish and krill are the major renewable resources in the South-
ern Ocean subject to exploitation. Japan and the Soviet Union have
engaged in krill fishing since the 1960s, and by the 1970s, Bulgaria,
Chile, West and East Germany, Poland, and South Korea had joined
(Beck, 1986, pp. 213--214). Today, only Japan and the Soviet Union
maintain commercial krill harvesting operations. Most of the fishing
operations are conducted farther north, in waters within the EEZs of
South America, and therefore subject to regulation by the countries
claiming those zones. The Soviets maintain the only significant fishing
operations in South Atlantic and Antarctic waters. The protein-rich krill
constitutes the major renewable resource of concern in Antarctic waters.
Krill is believed to be at the heart of the marine ecosystem in
the southern waters. Whales, seals, penguins, and various species of fish
feed on the zooplankton animal. Over-harvesting of seals and whales in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries depleted their numbers
and allowed krill populations to flourish. Whales and seals are protected
today, but their numbers have not increased sufficiently to reduce the
krill population. Fishing and krill harvesting, though on-going, is regu-
lated by the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR), which all of the treaty nations have signed.
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By 1985, the fish and krill exploitation was a $400 million industry. Krill
catches have been estimated at between 200,000 to 500,000 tons but,
considering the relative abundance of the animal (estimated in excess of
tens of millions of tons), current harvesting levels do not appear to be
cause for concern. (Parsons, 1987, pp. 7, 66)
3. The Exploitation Question
Location, cost, and the lack of appropriate technology are the
principal inhibitors of Antarctic resources exploitation. While exploitation
of renewable resources (e.g., fish and krill) has been undertaken, this
activity has so far been limited to a few countries, chiefly the Soviet
Union and Japan. Exploitation of these resources is, to some degree, self-
regulating, in that krill is a highly spoilable commodity, requiring near-
immediate refrigeration/freezing. Marketing problems associated with
krill include not only the quickly deteriorating nature of the product but
also the limited consumer acceptance of this strongly flavored product.
(Beck, 1986, p. 215)
Cost is also a factor in krill harvesting, owing to the necessity to
process the catch quickly to avoid deterioration. The countries which
exploit the marine animal are far removed from the harvest area and
must transport the catch several thousand miles to home markets.
Exploitation of renewable (living) resources has been success-
fully addressed through the conventions on seals and whales and the
CCAMLR; however, the exploitation question of non-renewable (mineral)
resources has not yet been settled satisfactorily. The conventions on liv-
ing resources were far more easily achieved because the treaty nations
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acknowledged that the resources were transitory, and no nation could
claim "ownership" of these resources. Such is not the case for the non-
renewable resources presumed to be located on the Antarctic landmass,
the ice shelves, the continental shelves, and seabeds of adjacent waters.
With seven nations claiming sovereignty over segments of the continent,
considerable controversy surrounds the exploitation of renewable as well
as mineral resources theorized to exist.
Prior Lu the late 1970s, the exploitation of mineral resources
was not a major issue because several constraints left the continent out
of the sphere of commercial influence. Geological studies were conducted
from a purely scientific standpoint with no view toward charting commer-
cially exploitable quantities. Also, technology for exploring and exploiting
reserves was not developed to a degree which would have permitted eco-
nomically feasible operations. (Westermeyer, 1984, pp. 39-41)
Cost, as well as technology, must be considered in non-
renewable resource exploitation. Current availability of minerals else-
where, plus the difficulty associated with exploitation of as-yet-unproven
reserves and lack of appropriate technology for recovery should conclu-
sive evidence of minerals bc found, make exploitation economically
unfeasible at this time. While technology is advancing daily and there is
progress in adapting Arctic procedures to Antarctic off-shore areas, the
hazards associated with oil recovery operations and the fear of environ-
mental damage generated by the possibility of spills preclude commercial
operations (Shapley, 1985, pp. 138-146). These problems notwithstand-
ing, significant attention has been focused on the question of a minerals
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regime which would be essential if economically exploitable minerals
were discovered and the technology needed for exploitation developed.
Environmental concerns also constitute a major consideration
for resources exploitation. The treaty members adopted a recommenda-
tion calling for "voluntary restraint" at the ninth consultative meeting of
the Antarctic Treaty System in 1977. The recommendation asked that all
nations refrain from exploration and exploitation of mineral resources
until an Antarctic minerals regime could be adopted (Shapley, 1985,
p. 139). However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, several nations had
dispatched research vessels to explore the most accessible regions (i.e.,
the continental shelves) in hopes of charring areas of economic interest.
4. The Minerals Regime
With the international scramble for resources, developing
nations clamoring for a larger share of the global wealth, and growing
concerns over environmental issues, the issue of a minerals regime for
Antarctica takes on increased importance. The Antarctic environment is
virtually untouched by man and has been all but closed to anyone other
than those engaged in scientific pursuit. With the discovery of trace, and
sometimes rare, minerals being reported, the Antarctic Treaty System is
faced with either creating a mechanism for the management of mineral
resources or the breakdown of the treaty regime which has been unique
in its international administration As discussed earlier, the Antarctic
Treaty did not address the issue of resource management, and the con-
ventions addressing the management of living resources, though suc-
cessful, do not provide a model for mineral resources in areas where
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ownership rights and sovereignty claims prejudice exploration/exploita-
tion attempts.
On June 2, 1988, following more than six years of negotiations,
representatives of 33 countries signed the Convention on the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) in Wellington, New
Zealand. CRAMRA represents the first international agreement designed
to manage mineral resources and is applicable to all non-living, natural,
non-renewable resources within the Antarctic Treaty zone, including
islands, ice shelves, sea floor, and the subsoil of offshore areas (Antarctic
Journal, December 1988, p. 13). Perhaps even more important than the
signatures of 33 out of 37 members is that all the nations which have
advanced territorial claims on the continent were among the 33 who par-
ticipated in the signing of CRAMRA. (Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice, Latin American, March 22, 1989, p. 44)
Although the treaty members recognized more than eight years
ago that exploitation of mineral resources presumed to exist in the area
required some sort of regulation, there has only existed an informal
agreement between the members to refrain from resource exploration and
development. The most recent meeting of the Consultative Parties (in
October 1989) failed to produce agreement on a formal document. There
was, however, son'2 advance mdde toward acceptance, and the agree-
ment is under study. Once the new convention is ratified by the govern-
ments of the individual member nations, it will replace the informal
agreement. Like other conventions to the treaty, it must be ratified by a
majority of the Consultative Members for it to enter into force.
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There is one last area of consideration when discussing Antarc-
tica and its relative importance in the region. That area deals with the
strategic definition of the continent. While little agreement is to be found
on the definition, the differing opinions are of interest, as outlined in the
following section.
D. STRATEGIC DEFINITION
There exist tremendous differences of opinion concerning the stra-
tegic definition and military potential of the Antarctic. One should recall
the Antarctic Treaty prohibits, under Article I, all measures of a military
nature: establishing bases, conducting military exercises, and weapons
testing. Article V expressly prohibits nuclear explosions, and Article VII
requires that advance notice be given prior to the introduction of any mil-
itary equipment or personnel. (It has already been established that
military personnel may be used in support of Antarctic scientific research
and manning of expeditions.)
Article VI of the treaty, besides defining the treaty area, serves to
confuse the issue of non-militarization. The article allows that nothing in
the treaty "shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights "...of any State
under international law with regard to the high seas within that area."
One might then question whether the area is, in fact, open for use by
naval vessels.
A study group from the David Davies Memorial Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Cambridge, UK, has posed the issue of Antarctic waters
being used by nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The
group disclaims any knowledge of an actual occurrence, and stipulates
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that thus far "it has made no military sense for the nuclear powers to use
Antarctica as a place in which to conceal SSBNs." (Parsons, 1987, p. 98)
However, the possibility is not discounted.
Both superpowers have developed sea-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) with increasing range capabilities. Current information indicates
U.S. sea-launched missiles have ranges of 7,400 kilometers and the
Soviet Union's range capability is 8,000 kilometers (Department of
Defense, 1989, pp. 46-47). This extension of range capability, asserts the
study, would make it possible for each power to threaten the other's
homeland from Antarctic waters (Parsons. 1987, p. 99). In addition,
naval design and construction of Soviet submarines has incorporated
features which permit the vessels to break through ice and allow the
SLBMs to be launched.
Antarctic waters could provide an ideal hiding place for the SSBNs.
Submarine-generated noise is masked by the ambient noise of the ice
pack and marine life. Also, satellite observation capabilities are "blinded,"
that is, unable to "see" through ice. While the scenario for Antarctic use
by SSBNs may seem unlikely at present, it is not without relevance and
should not be wholly discounted. Regardless of the viability of SSBN
"havens" in Antarctica, it must be recognized that the treaty does not ban
deployments to the region.
The other side of the argument is equally persuasive. Deborah
Shapley notes that "military technology has evolved so as to make the
Antarctic even less important strategically than in 1961," primarily
because "the United States has become less dependent on overseas
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bases" and the advances in satellite technology have made it "less
dependent on networks of ground-tracking stations, lessening the need
to use Antarctica to track satellites." (Shapley in Parsons, 1987, p. 101)
The evolution in technology, in Shapley's view, has lessened rather then
increased pressure to change the Antarctic Treaty to allow for military
use.
But Antarctic SSBN patrols are not the only possible variable in the
region's "strategic equation." The British study group continues its eval-
uation by testing Shapley's conclusion in light of technological change.
There are three potential areas for Antarctic military application, should
the Antarctic members move to amend the treaty: strategic defenses,
anti-satellite developments, and ballistic missile trajectory adjustment.
They conclude that Antarctica is "uninteresting" for land-based defensive
purposes, since the Soviets have apparently complied with the provisions
of the SALT Treaty regarding Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems
(FOBS). Though the Soviet Molniya communications and strategic early
warning satellites do track over the Pole, most satellites do not. The anti-
satellite role is judged marginal in light of the limited target availability
weighed against the probability of deploying such a system in Antarctica.
The final consideration, ballistic missile trajectory adjustment,
brings with it a large number of assumptions which make it highly hypo-
thetical and unrealistic at present. It assumes first that U.S. strategic
defenses would advance to a point that would make FOBS a more attrac-
tive option for the Soviets. This in itself assumes that the Soviets would
break the SALT constraints. The unlikelihood of the situation can only be
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qualified by noting that the United States might reconsider the practi-
cality of using Antarctica for missile tracking if the Soviet Union dis-
played renewed interest in FOBS. (Parsons, 1987, pp. 101-104)
The preceding discussion has centered on possible scenarios from
the perspective of superpower interests and conflict and does not address
the more probable scenario of regional conflict and its impact. As dis-
cussed in Chapter II, the likelihood of instability as a result of regional
tensions is more likely than competition between East and West in the
polar region.
As outlined previously, the countries of the Southern Cone,
particularly Argentina and Chile, are capable of bringing military power
to bear in Antarctica. Their interests in the continent are strong and tied
to national, as well as military, doctrine. Complicating their Antarctic
territorial claims (and interests) Is the overlapping claim by the United
Kingdom, as earlier elaborated.
Certainly, the potential for a conflict scenario is significant, particu-
larly if one of the countries were to feel its claim was threatened. Military
action by one of the countries would, by necessity, involve the other two,
as a measure of defending threatened interests or as an ally to one of the
"aggressors." The opposing argument in this scenario is that each coun-
try would be likely to find defense of its Antarctic claim an expensive
proposition, a risk which might not equate to appreciable benefits. At
best, each could effectively prevent occupation by the other(s), but none
could sustain such an undertaking for an extended period. It is, there-
fore, unlikely that any one country would undertake an offensive.
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IV. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
A. BACKGROUND
A major reason for the political stability and cooperation in Antarc-
tica is the Antarctic Treaty, a model of international cooperation, which
was signed in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1959 and entered into
force on June 23, 1961. It is important to note the events preceding the
agreement because they were influential in the conclusion of the treaty.
In the early 1950s, there was speculation that the Cold War would
extend into Antarctica as it had in Asia and the Middle East. This specu-
lation was lessened by the large-scale, high-visibility scientific programs
which were undertaken by both superpowers during the International
Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-1958. Antarctic "traditions" were estab-
lished by the United States and the United Kingdom through the con-
stant presence each maintained. The political tensions of the 1940s and
1950s (the Berlin Crisis and the 1956 Suez Crisis, among others) set the
stage for the "politics" of Antarctica preceding the first Antarctic IGY, and
it is because of the crises of the 1950s that many attribute to the treaty
the success in preserving the tranquility of the continent. (Beck, 1986,
pp. 21-23)
The Antarctic IGY 1957-1958 was considered not only a scientific
turning point but a political one as well. Previously, expeditions to
Antarctica had been undertaken for territorial claims or exploration/dis-
covery purposes. A minimal amount of significant scientific research was
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conducted, and what was undertaken was on a bilateral or trilateral
basis (the most significant undertaking was the British-Norwegian-
Swedish venture in 1949-1952, [Beck, 1986, p. 481). The controversy
surrounding sovereignty issues made extended cooperative ventures
difficult. It was not until 1955 and the establishment (in Paris) of the
Committee for the International Geophysical Year Conference, under the
auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), that a
"gentlemen's agreement" was reached concerning the sovereignty issue.
By this agreement, the governments suspended their territorial claims to
allow for the cooperation of the scientific communities. (Beck, 1986,
p. 48)
IGY 1957-1958 saw scientific cooperation between 12 nations
(Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the United States, and the
Soviet Union) and more than five thousand scientists situated at 55 sta-
tions around the continent. Projects included activities in the areas of
seismology, meteorology, glaciology, geomagnetism, and ionospheric
physics. (Beck, 1986, p. 49)
Beck has noted that, while the IGY and the treaty should not be
viewed as "cause and effect," they are interconnected. The IGY, with its
broad-based cooperation among different national scientific communities,
focused attention on Antarctica and the need for some type of insti-
tutional framework for its administration. Beck also notes that defects in
the treaty (such as the freezing of territorial claims for the duration of the
treaty) can be traced to the IGY. (Beck, 1986, p. 53)
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It is important to understand the history of the Antarctic Treaty in
order to understand the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) today and the
challenge it may face as 1991 approaches. The treaty did not solve the
sovereignty issue; it merely suspended it. A review of the treaty articles,
as well as the actors, will prove helpful in understanding the probable
obstacles which face the ATS in the future.
Consultative status is held by the original 12 signatory states:
Argentina, Chile, the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Australia, New
Zealand (all of whom hold territorial claims on the continent), the United
States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, South Africa, and Japan. States later
achieving consultative status include Poland, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Brazil, India, Peoples Republic of China, Uruguay, Italy, the
German Democratic Republic, Sweden, and Spain. (Antarctic Journal.
March 1988, pp. 1-2; December 1988, p. 7)
In addition to the consultative members, several states have acceded
to the Antarctic Treaty, that is, they have accepted and agreed to abide
by the principles and terms of the treaty. These countries may or may
not maintain an Antarctic presence or conduct scientific research, alone
or as a joint project with another state. Until 1983, states acceding to the
treaty did not gain significant rights or benefits. Since that time, how-
ever, acceding members have been allowed to attend the general Consul-
tative Meetings (normally held biannually) as observers. This privilege
has not been extended to attendance at Special Consultative Meetings,
however, which are held to discuss specific issues of concern to the
members, such as the creation of an Antarctic Minerals Regime (Beck.
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1986, pp. 149-150). Nations acceding to the treaty include Austria, Bul-
garia, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Czecho-
slovakia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, The Netherlands, Papua New
Guinea, Peru, Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Korea, and Romania.
(Antarctic Journal, March 1988, pp. 1-2)
The treaty does not establish a secretariat or permanent manage-
ment vehicle. The principal entity coordinating scientific cooperation is
the non-governmental Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR), which was established in 1958 under the auspices of UNESCO's
International Council of Scientific Unions.
The treaty itself has never undergone a formal amendment, but
significant addenda (or conventions) have been declared which supple-
ment the treaty and are internationally recognized. Among these are the
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora of
1964 and the 1980 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR).
B. REVIEW PROCESS
The issue of perhaps most concern for the Antarctic Treaty System is
the prospect of a treaty review, possibly as early as 1991. Much of the
concern stems from incorrect information on the review process and the
false assumption that a treaty review is required.
Article XII of the treaty, which also outlines the procedure for
amending the agreement, provides for a review conference 30 years after
the treaty enters into force (hence. 1991) if any of the Contracting Parties
requests one (Myhre, 1986, p. 38). The often overlooked word is "if,"
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which begins the second paragraph of the article. Therefore, a review of
the treaty is not automatic if all the members are satisfied with the
status quo.
It is unlikely that any of the members will request such a review, in
light of current circumstances. The United States has expressed its sup-
port for the existing ATS, as have the other members. Each of the mem-
bers, in its own way, has much to lose if the Treaty System were to break
down. As discussed earlier, the claims of the seven claimant states would
be jeopardized, and the research activities of all the countries currently
participating In Antarctica would be endangered. Most importantly, the
breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty System would bring with it the possi-
bility of conflict as all international actors vie for the resource wealth
Antarctica is thought to hold.
C. ALTERNATIVES IN THE ANTARCTIC FUTURE
The biggest challenge to the ATS will be the resolution of the
resources/exploitation question.
On 7 June, 33 nations ended six years of negotiations, agreeing to
regulate the development of the Antarctic's oil and mineral
resources. For the agreement to become binding, 16 of the 20 voting
members of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty must ratify it. These include
Argentina, Chile and Great Britain, which have overlapping claims in
the continent. (Scheina, 1989, p. 129)
While the most serious challenge to the continuation of the treaty
appears to be met (that of establishing a minerals regime), not until the
measure is fully ratified will the danger of dissolution pass. In the event
that the measure does not receive the required ratification, several alter-
natives can be envisioned for the continent. Jack Child has evaluated the
84
possibilities and categorized them into "cooperative," "conflictive," and
"mixed" outcomes. The likelihood of support from the various members
also is evaluated. (Child, 1988, pp. 192-204)
Possible cooperative outcomes, besides continuation of the ATS,
include an expansion of the current membership in an effort to coopt the
critics of the Antarctic "club" and perhaps derail the movement to inter-
nationalize the continent. This proposal, if made, would probably be sup-
ported by most of the treaty members, with some possible reservations
advanced by the claimant states in the interests of preserving their sov-
ereignty. Internationalization is another possible cooperative outcome; it
is supported by the Third World but opposed by the international envi-
ronmental groups, such as Greenpeace International, who support the
"world park" idea (Parsons, 1987, p. 35). One argument against the inter-
nationalization proposal is that it essentially would create another United
Nations-type organization for the management of the continent. Reaching
agreements on issues would follow the same course and face the same
problems as the General Assembly struggles with now.
"Conflictive outcomes would result from either polarization between
ATS states and outsiders or a breakdown of the treaty regime." (Child,
1988, p. 195) These outcomes include unilateral acts to secure sover-
eignty claims, individual resource exploitation, and open conflict between
two or more actors. In the interest of preserving the tranquility of the
region, it is most probable that other members, or states with interests in
the Antarctic, would intervene to prevent open conflict.
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V. U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION
There have been significant changes in Latin America, and particu-
larly the Southern Cone, in the past 25 years. Despite the current eco-
nomic difficulties in which most of the Latin American countries find
themselves, the standards of living and social indicators have generally
improved over the past 20 years. (Inter-American Development Bank,
1989, pp. 57-61)
Concurrently with improvements in the domestic arena, the coun-
tries have adopted a more outward-looking orientation as they pursue
their own development models and seek a place within the international
community. Unlike an earlier time, when the United States could assume
the lead in hemispheric activities and be assured of Latin American fol-
lowing, today the region's nations are more likely to pursue policies
which place their own interests ahead of hemispheric or regional inter-
ests. Latin America, particularly the Southern Cone countries, actively
pursues its own interests, which often are at odds with U.S. policy. The
belief that the United States can rely on a "special relationship" with
other nations in the hemisphere, which binds the countries into a
"natural alliance," is an outmoded assumption.
A. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
A secure (and friendly) southern flank is essential for the United
States to be able to project its power and influence toward other areas. In
the past, the United States has assigned a relatively low priority to Latin
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America and the region has played a limited role in U.S. global strategy.
In addition, the United States has been slow to acknowledge and react to
changes within the region. (Marcella, 1985, pp. 4-5)
The primary framework for U.S.-Latin American security relationship
is found in the Rio Pact and its collective security provisions. Through
various assistance and advisory programs, the United States became the
primary source of military training, equipment, and doctrine for the Latin
American militaries. However, while military relations were developed,
"the concept of collective military security languished since all nations in
the region understood that the United States would defend the Hemi-
sphere." (Marcella, 1985, p. 8)
With the advent of the human rights campaigns of the 1970s
directed towards various Latin nations, several of the region's countries
found themselves cut off from their traditional sources of supply and
support. "Self-reliance served to reinforce nationalist desires to increase
autonomy and lessen dependence upon the United States, particularly
among the big South American powers." (Marcella, 1985, p. 8)
The major disconnection between the United States and Latin Amer-
ica has been in threat perception. While the United States retains,
although less so today, an East-West perspective of national security, the
Latin American nations view their security from a North-South point of
view. The essential element of a "common foe" is simply not present in
the Western Hemisphere any longer. Where the United States views the
Soviet Union as its principal security threat, many Latin American
nations (particularly Argentina and Brazil) view the Soviets and the
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Eastern Bloc as important trade partners. This disconnection must be
viewed as the primary foreign policy and security challenge for the United
States in the Western Hemisphere.
B. THE U.S. NAVY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND ANTARCTICA
As earlier discussions have highlighted, U.S. relations with the
South Atlantic states have been an uneven proposition. For the most
part, this has not been true in military-to-military relations, and the U.S.
Navy has been one of the most constant features in U.S.-Latin American
military relations. Through its Antarctic involvement and Joint naval
exercises circumnavigating the South American continent, the U.S. Navy
is well acquainted with the South Atlantic. In addition, the U.S. Navy
supplements these activities through the bi-annual Inter-American Naval
Conference. (Wesson, 1986, p. 99)
1. UNITAS
The UNITAS series of naval exercises has been conducted
annually between the U.S. Navy and the Latin American navies since
1959. The maneuvers are usually bilateral, but 1988 saw a trilateral
venture which included the United States, Brazil, and Uruguay. The
Latin American navies are responsible for the operational plans (OPLANs)
for the exercise, with the U.S. Navy playing whatever role the Latins may
assign.
The exercise has been used by the United States and the Latin
American participants as a political tool. The Carter Administration
ordered Chile to be dropped from participating in 1977 as a reaction to
the Pinochet government's alleged human rights abuses. It was an
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executive order, not a U.S. Navy decision, to omit Chile from the exercise
schedule. In a move toward more normalized relations, the Reagan
Administration re-issued the invitation for Chilean participation.
(Schoultz, 1987. p. 182)
The Latin Americans also have used participation as a means of
communicating political messages: the Argentin,;s refused to participate
following U.S. support for Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War. It
should be noted that Argentina has declined to participate several years
since the late 1970s, citing "maintenance difficulties due to lack of spare
parts for its United States-supplied ships." (Wesson, 1986, p. 99)
Unlike most joint U.S.-Latin American military training and
cooperative ventures, the annual UNIIAS exercise provides more than a
political gesture. The navies gain significant experience and tactical
expertise through the planning and execution of exercise scenarios. The
exercises, for the most part, have survived the political ups and downs of
state-to-state relations.
2. Antarctic Logistic Support
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering
and Systems is the executive agent within the U.S. Departmen. of
Defense for Antarctic logistics and operations. Logistic support for U.S.
scientific activities in Antarctica is provided, on a reimbursable basis, by
the Navy, the Air Force, and Coast Guard.
The U.S. military role in Antarctica has a lengthy history dating
back to the 1960s, when U.S. Antai 2tic stations were staffed, for the
most part, by the military. Since that time, however, civilian scientists
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and support personnel have assumed a greater role. For example, during
the 1968-1969 season, the U.S. military presence was 213 personnel,
compared with 30 civilians; during 1981-1982, the U.S. complement
numbered 132 military personnel and 55 civilians (Beck, 1986, p. 71).
While there continues to be a significant military component, the ratio of
military to civilian personnel has continued to narrow, and at some sites
civilians outnumber military (Oceanographer of the Navy Report, 1989,
pp. 5-9, 5-10). The Navy (and DoD) is unlikely to change its role in sup-
port of the U.S. Antarctic Project (USAP). Routine activities in support of
the USAP have provided an "important contingency for Arctic operations
if they were ever needed." (Oceanographer of the Navy Report, 1989,
p. 2-3)
Proponents of a continued military support presence argue that
it provides a means of making U.S. presence felt, serves to inhibit open
conflict, and provides visible proof of U.S. interest in the region. The pro-
ponents also argue that, should potential future commercial operations
be threatened, a military presence might be needed. If the military pres-
ence is removed, redeployment, for any reason, at a later date could be
viewed as provocative and/or threatening (Oceanographer of the Navy
Report, 1989, pp. 2-1, 2-2). Noting the earlier discussion of possible out-
comes for the Antarctic in the future, this rationale is valid.
C. THE NAVY ROLE IN A STRATEGIC SCENARIO
The question arises of U.S. naval capability to secure the sea lines of
communication and ensure strategic access and denial in light of its
relatively limited presence in the South Atlantic. As one of the means of
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protecting U.S. interests in the region, the Navy must rely on its links
with regional navies, depending on the issue involved.
While the southern lanes are not as critical for U.S. supply as they
are for other nations, the United States, through the U.S. Navy, must
ensure their security. As discussed previously, the Navy's interest pri-
marily rests on the principles of freedom of the seas and the right of inno-
cent passage. These have been consistently upheld in international
waters around the world, and the Southern Ocean is no exception. The
Brazilian proposal to demilitarize the South Atlantic has not gone with-
out U.S. challenge; the U.S. Navy continues to assert the principles of
navigational rights in what the U.S. considers international waters.
Though SLOC defense exercises are routinely conducted in conjunc-
tion with northern allies, it has not been the focus of the UNITAS exer-
cises because the Latin American navies have preferred ASW exercises.
The protection of the southern SLOCs most likely would not be a priority
in the event of an East-West confrontation because hostilities would most
logically be focused farther north. It is doubtful that the Soviets have suf-
ficient assets available to disrupt shipping in the South Atlantic any
more than the United States (or NATO) has assets to dedicate for their
protection. In the unlikely event of open conflict in the South Atlantic,
the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct SLOC protection, given the lack of
support facilities in the region, cannot be assumed.
91
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed some of the issues which could focus inter-
national attention on the South Atlantic and Antarctica in the future. The
United States has significant interests in the region which may require
traditional policies and approaches to be re-evaluated in light of the
changing circumstances.
Competing interests and the complexity of relations in the South
Atlantic will complicate U.S. foreign policy, and the Navy's role in those
policies, in the 1990s and beyond. While long-range goals may have
remained consistent, the methods used in achieving those goals have, all
too often, tended to send mixed signals to the nations the U.S. most
needs to ensure its interests. In this instance, the United States might
well learn from examining the Soviet approach in Latin America.
Emphasizing interests which are compatible and mutually beneficial,
conducting relations as equals, not subordinates, and maintaining a
pragmatic approach have yielded the Soviets significant gains.
The difficulty in assigning the South Atlantic and Antarctica a
discrete strategic value further complicates policy formulation for the
United States. Accepting the evaluation of the area as a "strategic
vacuum" tends to lend credence to the militarization concept. This in
turn may stimulate the states of the region to assume a more active
military role, which could invite an extension of superpower or regional
rivalry into the area. To accept the evaluation of the area as being of no
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military-strategic value garners equally unfavorable results because it
does not account for possible interest by the Soviets or other extra-
hemispheric actors.
The issues presented in this paper, taken separately, do not in
themselves present an overwhelming risk to the United States. The con-
fluence, on the other hand, presents a formidable challenge. The range of
subjects and options and the multiplicity of policies needed to address
them require clear, long-range goals and consistent methods for achiev-
ing them.
Taken singly, the issues are not likely to unduly stress inter-Ameri-
can relations, but widely variable policy choices and conflicting actions
will only serve to reinforce the Latin American perception of the U.S.
propensity for inconsistent relations and the consistency of growing
Soviet relations. One of the most important challenges of the 1990s for
U.S. foreign policy will be the resolution of tensions and the reduction of
conflict potential in the South Atlantic and Antarctica.
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